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ABSTRACT

Lewis Carroll (Rev. Charles Dodgson) is a language specialist who has verifiably altered
our lexicon and created fictional worlds that serve as commentary on our ability to effectively
create meaning within our existing communicative systems. This ability to create language and
illustrations of everyday language issues can be traced back to his personal quest for order and
meaning; the logician and teacher has uncovered the accepted language and language practices
that can result in verbal confusion and ineffective speech, as well as the accepted practices that
can help us to avoid verbal confusion and social conflict—all of which reveals a theorist in his
own right, one who aides our understanding of signification and pragmatic social skills.
Dodgson’s fictive representations of our ordinary language concerns serve as concrete examples
of contextual language interactions; therefore, they serve as appropriate material for the teaching
of rhetorical theory and, most especially, language arts.
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PROLOGUE
As I jumped down the rabbit-hole into the Wonderland we call rhetoric, I knew that I
would be struggling to get into the garden. Philosophical forays have never been my forte.
Philosophers are usually difficult to understand and appear to talk in circles; which is, no doubt,
why Oscar Wilde commented on the subject:
Answered the Rocket. "I am not going to stop talking to him
merely because he pays no attention. I like hearing myself talk. It
is one of my greatest pleasures. I often have long conversations all
by myself, and I am so clever that sometimes I don't understand a
single word of what I am saying."
"Then you should certainly lecture on Philosophy," said the
Dragon-fly. (“The Remarkable Rocket”)
Wilde understood that philosophy to most of us regular folks is received as just plain hot air. Yet,
we all sense there is something there, which is why we keep trying to find the key that will get us
into the garden.
While struggling to find the key to my understanding of the philosophy behind rhetoric, I
was also developing a plan for the revival of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
(1865) and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871)1 as language arts
instruction material. During the preparation of a sample reading lesson for middle grades
students, I had remembered my beloved Alice in Wonderland, mainly because I had read it over
twenty times, enjoying it just as immensely the last time as I did the first. One lesson grew into

1

Texts that are now more commonly known as Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass.
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two and then three. After creating an entire unit, I found that I had not nearly covered all of the
material made available by Carroll.
Eventually, I was able to identify possible lesson plans for eighth grade students on
reading, writing, grammar, communication, speech, etc. that employed the wor(l)ds of Alice. In
fact, I had calculated that 92% of the standard performance indicators required by the state of
Tennessee could be facilitated with a trip into Carroll’s created lands. I had already sensed that
the Alice books were about language, but this creation of lesson plans led me to the epiphany that
the Alice books were about all aspects of language and speech and communication, not just
created and playful language.
After a short struggle with rhetorical theory and philosophy, I found that applying
Carroll’s wor(l)ds to the theorists that I was encountering helped me to truly grasp the theories
they espouse. My Bakhtin text shows evidence that my drinking from Alice’s wor(l)ds led me to
a better taste of Mikhail Bakhtin, which, in turn, led me to drinking from Dodgson’s larger
world. Like Alice, I grew smaller and larger with ever sip and bite, until I was just the right size
for my foray into the gardens of rhetorical theory. But, like Alice, I didn’t start to grasp the order
until I got into the garden, where the results of miscommunication bloom like the white roses
that were supposed to be red.
Applying Carroll’s wor(l)ds to these theories brought about another epiphany: the Alices
should be used to illustrate rhetorical theory. My hopes of some ground-breaking publication
vanished like the Cheshire Cat as I researched what had already been done in this realm.
However, with Gilles DeLeuze’s smile still lingering, I realized that what has not been done is
the uniform presentation of Rev. Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) as theorist who had taken up
themes that both preceded and proceeded the Oxford logician and writer of children’s tales, a
x

theorist who offers a space to explore the theories that existed during his time and the ones that
were created later, a theorist who offers his own take on rhetoric and the language that is used to
create it. Furthermore, I did not find an assertion that Dodgson’s fiction is a useful tool for
teaching rhetorical theory.
My assertion that Dodgson was able to provide useful and effective teaching tools should
come as no surprise; after all, the evidence of his life points to the over-arching ethos of teacher.
He was, after all, a teacher of mathematics, and he did create numerous games and puzzles for
children that were meant to encourage logical thinking 2. He even wrote letters to his childfriends that at first glance appear merely comical but always reveal a lesson 3. In all he did, we
sense evidence of a man who was interested in teaching others the order that his logical mind
created, even if that meant telling the Queen that she had been remiss in not visiting her subjects
on the Emerald Isle4. Furthermore, Virginia Woolf recognized Dodgson as a teacher first and
foremost: “If Oxford dons in the nineteenth century had an essence, he was that essence”
(48).Therefore, it should come as no surprise that my study is merely the result of one teacher
recognizing the effective lessons that another teacher has created, as well the knowledge-base
that allowed him to create them.

2

“One of Carroll’s great interests in later life was in developing logic as an entertainment for young people, and he
spent a great deal of time on this” (Jenny Woolf 52).
3

Consider his letter to Princess Alice (15 Aug 1892): “I am sending my best love, for you to divide with your
brother: and I would advise you to give two-thirds to him, and take three-quarters for yourself” (The Letters 924).
4

On 11 June 1897, Dodgson wrote to Lord Salisbury to urge the Queen to visit Ireland: “‘The Irish,’ a friend said to
me the other day, ‘are a race of Celts: and a Celt must have a chieftain!’ That means, I take it, a visible chieftain:
whereas I fear our Queen has been, all these years, to our Irish brethren, vox, et praeterea nihil [‘a voice and nothing
more’]” (The Letters 1126).
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: GETTING INTO THE
RHETORICAL GARDEN

Let the tutor, above all things, impress upon the minds of his pupil
what merit there is in a just disposition of parts, and a becoming
treatment of subjects.
—Quintilian, On the Teaching of Speaking and Writing
Carroll’s wor(l)ds are still thriving, a fact which is most obvious because they are still
affecting the creation of speech, texts, songs, movies, and imitators world-wide. Most recent
proof of this assertion is Tim Burton’s Alice in Wonderland (2010), Kerli’s “Welcome to the Tea
Party” (2010), David Denby’s Snark: A Polemic in Seven Fits (2009), and the appearance of
Carrollese5 on the “word-of-the-day” apps. But the fact that Carroll has created ideologically
meaningful works is most easily recognized in the still useful language arts and rhetoric lessons
we find within his works, in the many theories that have danced with Alice, and the theory that
can be found once we jump into the rabbit-hole.
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking-Glass, and What
Alice Found There (1871) are widely accepted as Victorian era creations that resulted from a
purely Victorian mind, which is why Florence Lennon felt she was able to view Victoria through

5

I am employing the term Carrollese in a new fashion. The OED gives the following definition for Carrollese,
Carrollian, and Carrolline: “Resembling, or characteristic of, the style of ‘Lewis Carroll’ (C. L. Dodgson (1832–
98), author of ‘Alice's Adventures in Wonderland’)”; however, I find that Carrollese is better defined as Dodgson’s
created words and phrases.

the Looking-Glass. While scholarship has certainly situated the Alice books in a Victorian
context, the reader of these texts finds that the author has given us a Wonderland and a Lookingglass world and characters that are not so easily deposited into a known era or culture. Certainly,
some of the words or phrases employed are typically Victorian (or British); however, those
words are used in a manner that reveals their meanings through context6. In fact, a close
consideration of Wonderland and the Looking-glass world reveals that Lewis Carroll (Rev.
Charles Dodgson) has created an imaginary world where our ability to communicate effectively
through language is considered not within the confines of a historical, worldly context but
merely as a function of human expression in social settings. And in this manner he is able to
address so many of the issues that are of concern in the world we know, where language,
particularly English, proves just as problematic as it proves helpful. In his Alice books, Carroll
gives us prime examples of the inherent issues experienced with our figurative language; the
problems that arise when we employ homophones, homograms, and homonyms; the reason that
syntactic rules are necessary; the importance of pragmatic social communication skills; the
powerful nature of our speech; and various other issues related to language and
communication—all the things that novels demonstrate about language. In essence, Carroll has
given us not only enjoyable children’s literature, but also enjoyable language lessons.
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (AIW) and Through the Looking-Glass, and What
Alice Found There (TLG) have served as the impetus for an ever-evolving Carrollian discourse

6

When Alice remarks that she will have to send her shoes to her feet “‘by carrier’” (AIW 12), the meaning of carrier
is discernible through the context in which the word is used, as Alice follows mention of the term with the comment
“‘how funny it’ll seem, sending presents to one’s own feet’” (AIW 12). Alice feels it is odd “‘to be going messages
for a rabbit!’” (AIW 30), but we understand that she means errands because she says this after being told to retrieve
items from the Rabbit’s house.
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community7, one that Robin Lakoff finds to reveal “the centrality” of AIW and TLG (368) and
one which certainly speaks to their author’s lasting influence, yet in most aspects Carroll cannot
be considered revolutionary. He created an imaginary world, produced his own words,
personified animals, humorously commented upon social and political concerns of the day, and
parodied the poetry and literature of his time, all of which had been previously done, even in the
so-called “children’s literature” that appeared before the creation of AIW and TLG. However,
something about Carroll’s tales made them more relatable and more timeless than any children’s
story that had been published before and most that came after the release of AIW and TLG8. And
that something lies in the way that he has illustrated a concern we all—young and old—face at
one time or another: how to communicate effectively.
My consideration of Dodgson—the man and the author we call Carroll—has led to a
realization that, while no white (or black) stone appears to have gone unturned in the vast
Carrollian discourse community, the lessons he was able to impart about communication and
language in his Alice books have been left buried—or at least partially so.
At the heart of Alice’s worlds stands a man who was in essence a theorist, a man whose
interest in order and meaning (and whose sharp wit) allowed him to create enjoyable illustrations
of rhetorical as well as linguistic theory. When we compare Dodgson’s approach to teaching to
7

I have applied the term Carollian discourse community to the plethora of writings that have been centered around
or that have been created because of Dodgson’s life and texts. The OED gives the following definition for
Carrollese, Carrollian, and Carrolline: “Resembling, or characteristic of, the style of ‘Lewis Carroll’ (C. L.
Dodgson (1832–98), author of ‘Alice's Adventures in Wonderland’)”; however, based on Claire Kramsch’s
application of discourse community when speaking of those who interest themselves with the work of Emily
Dickinson (17-18), I felt “Carrollian” was a most fitting adjective for this discourse community “that has a broadly
agreed set of common public goals and purposes in its use of [. . . ] written language” (Kramsch 127).
8

Consider MacDonald’s Cross Purposes (1862) and The Princess & The Goblin (1872), as well as Kingsley’s The
Water Babies, A Fairy Tale for a Land Baby (1863), which ironically won a Lewis Carroll Shelf Award in 1963. In
fact, sixty-four books were awarded the Lewis Carroll Shelf Award between 1958 and 1979. The list serves as a
veritable what’s what in the world of children’s literature, as well as a list of many books that are not as
recognizable or have not been as marketable as the Alices.

that of Burke’s, we find a perfect example of why Dodgson’s fiction offers a better way to
explain rhetorical theory, as Dodgson has provided not only an amusing look at faulty
communication, but also a more sensible explanation of how ambiguity or vagueness occurs. In
trying to explain vagueness, Kenneth Burke exhumes John Locke’s philosophical rant:
The ambiguity of substance affords [ . . . ] a major resource of
rhetoric. We can appreciate this by referring again to John Locke,
when he says that in speaking of substance “we talk like children:
who being questioned what such a thing is which they know not,
readily gives this satisfactory answer, that it is something; which in
truth signifies no more, when so used [ . . . ] but that they know not
what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what
they have no distinct idea of at all.” (Motives 1317)
Burke has chosen the approach that many theorists choose; he has tried to explain his theory with
theory—from a philosopher, no less. Contrariwise, Dodgson (as Carroll) explains vagueness by
providing an amusing example of inadequate evidence:
They told me you had been to her,
And mentioned me to him:
She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim.
He sent them word I had not gone
(We know it to be true):
If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?
If I or she should chance to be
Involved in this affair,
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.
My notion was that you had been
(Before she had this fit)
An obstacle that came between
Him, and ourselves, and it.
Don’t let him know she liked them best,
For this must ever be
4

A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me. (AIW 129)
By presenting the poem as evidence in a court case, Dodgson does not have to turn didactic. He
makes us unearth the issues inherent in the poem when Alice argues that the poem cannot be
used to convict the Knave because it proves nothing: “If any one of them can explain it [ . . . ] I’ll
give him sixpence. I don’t believe there’s an atom of meaning in it” (AIW 130). We can easily
figure out that lacking pronoun antecedents result in our ignorance and confusion as to who he,
she, them are. Without antecedents for the pronouns, we have no way of knowing who has done
what or to whom the author of the poem is referring; consequently, Alice is right—and quite
sensible, I might add. Where Burke has tried to explain an abstract idea with an abstract
explanation, Dodgson has given us a concrete example of how vagueness occurs, as well as a
concrete example that makes the topic seem much more important to the average person.
Dodgson was a man whose interest in language and doing all effectively led him to share
his observations of ineffective communication, which allowed him to create language arts
lessons that are valid over a century and an half later. That Dodgson was able to create language
that has been adopted by speakers world-wide should not be surprising given his obvious grasp
of language and communication. That Dodgson was concerned with effective communication
should not be surprising given that he was a man who sought order in all that he did. In this
study, I consider Carrollese and the Carrollian world as evidence that Dodgson was a theorist
whose personality and style allowed him to create effective, enjoyable, and lasting lessons in
language arts and rhetorical theory. Overall, I am arguing that Dodgson’s commentary on the
English language can be considered as offering a theory of communication because AIW and
TLG are persuasion pieces written for an audience that can effect change. Dodgson, ever the
5

rule-maker and rule-follower, has used his children’s literature to point out the accepted language
and language practices that are not sufficient and therefore result in verbal confusion and
ineffective speech, as well as the accepted language rules that help us to avoid verbal confusion
when they are followed.
In Chapter II: No-nonsense Carrollese, I give evidence that Dodgson was a man whose
quest for order permeated his entire life and whose created language reveals a language specialist
who was able to impact language in a meaningful way.
In Chapter III: Don’t Forget the Porpoise: The Rhetorical Dodgson, I show how
Dodgson’s works have been employed by other theorists as examples, how some claim that
Dodgson is a pragmatist or a semiotician, and how Dodgson’s rhetoric reveals him as a theorist
in his own right.
In Chapter IV: The Carrollian Art of Language, I give evidence that Dodgson’s
fantastical tales can be used as both language arts and rhetorical theory instruction, as they
exemplify most of the language arts standards required for eighth grade students 9 and serve as
concrete examples of abstract theoretical ideas.
In Chapter V: The Dodgson Legacy: Reeling and Writhing with Language, I reiterate the
usefulness of Dodgson’s fiction as teaching tools that provide concrete and relatable examples
for children and college students alike.

9

By the State of Tennessee.
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CHAPTER II
NO-NONSENSE CARROLLESE

Jack: You never talk anything but nonsense.
Algernon: Nobody ever does.
—Oscar Wilde, “The Importance of Being Earnest”
The Man and His Sensibilities…
Rev. Charles Dodgson, who initially wished to remain separate from Lewis Carroll—the
writer of children’s stories—was an Oxford don, an ordained minister, a mathematician, a famed
photographer, a political theorist, an activist, a published writer, and a concerned English citizen
who considered himself a loyal subject of Queen Victoria. Given the vast biographies and
biographical sketches available on Dodgson, it appears unnecessary to include the usual
biographical information in this study. However, in considering that Carrollese has been
assimilated into our lexicon and the claim of some that Carrollese is nothing more than nonsense,
it is worth noting that Dodgson was an accomplished man whose personality would not have
allowed him to create nonsense.
Numerous authors have tackled the subject of Dodgson the man, and few who have
written about him in earnest have failed to notice his quest for order. D. B. Eperson points out
that Dodgson’s first published text, A Syllabus of Plane Algebraic Geometry, was “an attempt to
arrange in logical sequence the processes of analytical geometry” (93). It seems odd that
Dodgson would feel the subject of geometry was not a clearly ordered system; however, he
apparently felt the need “to give definitions to the concepts of algebraic geometry and to outline

the axioms on which the subject is based” (Eperson 93). John Pudney describes a man who “kept
a note of every menu served to guests in his room, so that no visitor should be confronted with
the same meal twice” (92). Michael Holquist maintains that you cannot seriously study Dodgson
without recognizing his desire to order everything about him: “Dodgson's whole career can best
be understood as a quest for order” (102). Besides mentioning Dodgson’s attempts to ensure that
his publications were as perfect as possible, games were conducted properly, and governmental
affairs conducted efficiently and fairly, Holquist also draws attention to the minutiae that
Dodgson felt worthy of his time and attention:
When he had packages to be wrapped, he drew diagrams so precise
that they showed to a fraction of an inch just where the knots
should be tied; he kept congeries of thermometers in his
apartments and never let the temperature rise above or fall below a
specific point. (102-103)
Stuart Dodgson Collingwood cites an article written in The Guardian to illustrate how
Dodgson’s sermons were critiqued as the essence of order: “‘his argument mapped out in the
form of a diagram, [ . . . ] he set to work to prove it point by point’” (76). And Pudney notes that
even the boy Dodgson was so concerned with structure that he wrote out the duties of a station
master after riding a train (31). It is obvious to anyone who has studied Dodgson that he was not
a man who would purposefully create chaos or nonsense. Yet, if you look up the genre to which
AIW and TLG have been assigned, you would undoubtedly find the word “Nonsense”—a
classification that any serious member of the Carrollian discourse community would have to
refute. Dodgson apparently did not complain about this classification of nonsense. However, a
most fitting response may be found in TLG: “‘You may call it “nonsense” if you like,’ [the Red
Queen] said, ‘but I’ve heard nonsense compared with which that would be as sensible as a
dictionary!’” (170)
8

Oxford English Dictionary (OED) tells us that a book that has been declared nonsense is
“a book of nonsense.” The generally accepted notion in the field of literature is that a nonsense
book lacks a system of logic, which most likely stems from the term nonsense that means
“relating to absence of rationality or meaning” (OED) or the one that means “absurdity,
nonsensicalness” (OED), but most likely not the one that means “a trivial or worthless thing”
(OED). However, we treat books that have been declared nonsense as trivial or, even worse, as
incapable of contributing to our knowledge.
Michael Holquist decries this label of nonsense for Dodgson’s fiction because he senses
what others have sensed: Dodgson does not give us absurdity—he does not give us gibberish. In
“What is a Boojum? Nonsense and Modernism,” Holquist concedes the label of nonsense for
Dodgson’s works, but he does so with a disclaimer; he wants us to recognize nonsense as
a system in which, at its purest, words mean only one thing, and
they get that meaning through divergence from the system of
nonsense itself, as well as through divergence from an existing
language system. (105)
Holquist is trying to rescue Dodgson’s fiction from the realm of absurdity or gibberish because
he senses in Alice’s worlds, like in everything else Dodgson did, a “compulsion toward order”
(104). However, Holquist’s phrasing leads us to believe that nonsense in the wor(l)ds of Alice
results from a comparison of a new system to an existing system of language. And that is not the
case. Dodgson only plays with our existing language or linguistic structure, which Holquist does
acknowledge while discussing “Carroll’s portmanteaux”: They are
not gibberish because they operate according to the rule which says
that all coinages in the poem will grow out of the collapse of two
known words into a new one. Carroll can display words he invents
and still communicate, because he does so according to rules. (114)

9

August Imholtz agrees with Holquist on this point, asserting that “Carroll’s work, and
‘Jabberwocky’ in particular, is very English in its language, both real and invented” (211 - 12).
Dodgson has not given us gibberish because Dodgson has given us our own language;
furthermore, Dodgson has not given us gibberish or a comparison of systems. The logician and
the logophile gave us our system, specifically the nonsense (or irrationality) that is created
everyday when our existing language system does not allow for the logical transference of
meaning. Dodgson, the man obsessed with order, had realized that some of our language and our
communication rules are nonsensical, and Dodgson the Oxford don intended to show us the error
of our ways through “Uncle Dodgson’s” entertaining wit.
Dodgson’s children’s tales contain an impressive commentary on language which has
stood the test of time, which explains why they have never gone out of print and are still being
read by children world-wide10. Calling Dodgson’s meaningful tales of childhood and language
nonsense is not logical: “‘If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn’t, it
ain’t. That’s logic’” (TLG 191). Imholtz reminds us that “Carroll once remarked of his nonsense
verse that ‘a perfectly balanced mind could understand it’” (225). T. B. Strong certainly
understood it; he understood that “Mr. Dodgson has shown the existence of all sorts of pitfalls
and surprises round the ordinary course of conversation” (42). Dodgson felt that a perfectly
balanced mind could understand the logic of his children’s tales because his children’s tales
discuss the language we all use; they are merely meant to persuade us that our language needs to

10

According to the University of British Columbia, an institution that maintains an impressive Carroll collection,
“the Carroll classics have been translated into more than 60 languages” (“Alice's Adventures in Wonderland”). AIW
was first published in America in 1866; from 1866 to 1977 136 official editions were published in the U.S.
(Handbook).

10

make sense if we are going to communicate effectively and signify meaning as desired. Since it
is children who are taught the rules of language, children are logically the perfect audience for a
commentary on how language is ordered. Dodgson’s readers may not all have understood that he
was commenting on language or have been of a “perfectly balanced mind,” but they have been
mostly of one mind—the mind that enjoys the Carrollian world and the language found within it.

And His Words
Dodgson was a man who craved a meaningful, orderly existence, and he was a man who
created words that at one time appeared disorderly and meaningless. However, when we consider
Carrollese and its adoption by English speakers, we find that Carrollese has filled a perceived
gap in our vocabulary. Strong recognizes this notion in “Lewis Carroll,” where he insists that the
word chortle was immediately included in a dictionary because “it supplied a felt want in the
language” (43). The English language has the largest lexicon of any language; at this point, it
hardly seems necessary to borrow more words to express ourselves, even more unnecessary
would be to borrow the fabricated language of an imaginary world initially created for one small
Victorian girl; however, we have adopted Carrollese as English. Based on the belief that “lexical
borrowing is often triggered by a perceived gap in the vocabulary of the recipient language,
particularly with respect to cultural phenomena associated with the source or donor language”
(Schendl 56), our continued use of Carrollese reveals esteem for the words and appreciation for
the world from which they derive.
“‘Curiouser and curiouser!’” exclaimed the young heroine of the movie Ondine (2009).
Presented as an exclamation for the first time, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, by
Lewis Carroll in AIW, this particular exclamation is recognizable world-wide. In Ondine, a
11

young girl sees a woman swimming around in a lake in her fine new dress as if that were normal
behavior; therefore, the girl’s use of this Carrollian exclamation is completely appropriate, as it is
employed to signify surprise in a most unusual situation. “Curiouser and curiouser!” exclaimed
Kevin E. Noonan on the Patent Docs: Biotech & Pharma Patent Law & News Blog; apparently,
Noonan finds the continuing “rift that has arisen between the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
and the Justice Department over the question of patent-eligibility for isolated genes” quite an
unusual conundrum (“Curiouser and Curiouser”). “Curiouser and Curiouser” appears to have
been taken up as a book title in 1932 by the publisher Maggs Bros. for their encyclopedic listing
of odd writings: “Curiouser and Curiouser:” A Catalogue of Strange Books and Curious Titles.
And it has been usefully employed as a title ever since, with the most recent non-biographical
utilization found in Joan Wendland’s Alice in Corporateland: A Curiouser and Curiouser
Bizness (2010). In fact, Google Books lists 220 books published in 2010 alone that include the
phrase “curiouser and curiouser.” Many similar examples may be discussed, as Carrollian
language has become yet another loan language from which English speakers borrow words,
much like French and Latin. For instance, the most famous quote used to describe J.R.R. Tolkien
is C.S. Lewis’s “You might as well (to adapt the White King) try to influence a bandersnatch”
(Lewis as qtd. in Collected Letters). And, most recently, the authors of Limits to Parallel
Computation: P-Completeness Theory (1995) employ the term bandersnatch to illustrate the
conundrum they will be addressing: “Your company can take an n-word specification of a
bandersnatch and, in about n3 steps, can test if the specification is reasonable and design an
optimal bandersnatch that meets it” (Greenlaw, et al. 3). As these examples illustrate, Carrollese
has been adopted as English, an assertion which is verified by the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED).
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The OED lists several words which are believed to be the sole creation of Dodgson,
including bandersnatch, galumphing, Cheshire Cat, outgrabe, jabberwocky, mimsy, vorpal,
manxome, frabjous, tulgey, jubjub, slithy, mome, boojum, and chortled. Additionally, the OED
attributes “curiouser and curiouser” to Dodgson (as Carroll) and the terms Carrollese,
Carrolline, and Carrollian to the desire for describing Dodgson or Dodgson-like styles, tones,
topics, or language. Approximately 150 OED quotations are contributed to Dodgson11 and his
nom de plume; 21 of which are “first quotations” that have resulted from his invented Carrollese.
Furthermore, the definition of rabbit hole, when used figuratively, as it is in The Matrix, is
recognized as Carrollese: “2. fig. Used to indicate passage into a strange, surreal, or nonsensical
situation or environment [ . . . .] with allusion to ‘L. Carroll’ Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
(1865)” (OED).
The OED bears testimony to the immediate and lasting adoption of Carrollese. C.S.
Lewis is cited as using Carrollese in The Allegory of Love (1936): “Always at a critical moment,
a strange knight, a swift ship, a bandersnatch or a boojum breaks in.” Furthermore, Rudyard
Kipling is cited as using frabjous; J.B. Priestley is cited for his use of rabbit hole; and several
OED citations for Carrollese involve New Yorker magazine, Newsweek magazine, and Yale Law
Journal. While the OED is not a comprehensive publication that will note every use of
Carrollese, it is, currently, the most respected dictionary of the English language, and the entries
attributed to Dodgson and his nom de plume, as well as the citations which include him, are
plentiful enough.

11

One of the citations listed for Dodgson is doppelgänger; while he is not credited with the creation of the word, he
is credited with the modern conventional spelling.
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The OED offers definitive proof that Carrollese has been adopted by English speakers,
but scientific journals evidence the adoption of Carrollese by other languages, as well. Of special
note is the word boojum, a word that has come to describe a pattern that arises during one of the
phases of superfluid helium-3, whose motion can result in the decay of a supercurrent (Boojums
3-4). David Mermin’s insistence that this phenomenon be called boojum resulted not only in a
change to the scientific approach of nomenclature, but also in created Russian words: budzhum,
budzhumi, budzhumom, and budzhumami (“Writing Physics” 300).
While the continued use of Dodgson’s created vocabulary is certainly worth noting, his
created vocabulary does not constitute the entire body of Carrollese. Most utterances employed
in the creation of AIW and TLG can be considered Carrollese because of the way they are
employed, which is evidenced by Michael Hoey in “Lexical Priming and Literary Creativity.”
Hoey determined the effects of Carrollese on our lexical expectations by investigating Dodgson’s
impact on language priming 12 and found that Carrollese has affected our understanding of
English at a basic and an instinctual level. Hoey has ascertained that we are primed for our
language associations—semantic, pragmatic, syntactical—by our first experiences with a word
(8); with this assumption made, Hoey studied the response of people who hear the phrase “The
time has come,” which he chose from TLG (10). He found that most people are primed to
12

In “Syntactic Priming: Investigating the Mental Representation of Language,” Branigan et al. explain language
priming, specifically syntactic priming: “If the processing of a stimulus affects the processing of another stimulus,
then the two stimuli must be related along a dimension that is relevant to the cognitive system. Under certain
circumstances, we can conclude that they are represented in a related manner. If the relationship between two stimuli
is syntactic, then we can use this relationship as a way of understanding what syntactic information is represented,
and how that information can interact with other information. We define syntactic priming as the proposal that
processing a particular syntactic structure within a sentence affects the processing of the same (or a related) syntactic
structure within a subsequently presented sentence” (490).
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associate the phrase with a speech or communication act, with a quotation position, and with a
non-finite clause beginning with the word to (13). In essence, Hoey maintains “that Lewis
Carroll’s sentence conforms to most of the priming that native speakers of the language are
likely to have and overrides a few” (15). His study reveals the effects of Carrollese, even when
the Carrollese is not the invented words of Dodgson, as he credits Dodgson with “the
establishment of new primings” (18).
Primings are related to phrasal context, or the way that our mind makes logical
connections between words. I.A. Richards, whose theory revolves around meaning derived from
phrasal context, ends The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) with a reference to “Jabberwocky”:
[This notion of a word as being backed up by other words that are
not uttered or thought of] is only recognizing on a larger, wider
scale the principle that Lewis Carroll was using in Jabberwocky.
(1293)
Richards is commenting on the fact that, while we may not have a ready referent available for the
created words of Dodgson, we can derive meaning from “Jabberwocky” because Dodgson
created words that fit into our rules of language, such as how graphemes may be presented and
which parts of speech may go where—or how words and phrases logically go together.
The words and phrases we consider Carrollese are sufficient evidence that the children’s
author and logician did not unconsciously create language. If his words had been created from a
haphazard, ignorant approach, he would not have been able to impact our language in a solid and
lasting way. The fact that Dodgson was able to create words and phrases that have been
thoroughly adopted as part of the English language reveals his intricate and thorough
understanding of language. Furthermore, Dodgson’s fiction and his own thoughts on the words
he created for TLG were presented as evidence in Eastman Photographic Materials v.
15

Comptroller General of Patents, Designs, and Trademarks (1898) to prove that all words have
meanings, whether we know the word is invented or not. Moreover, Humpty Dumpty’s take on
language was presented as a condemnation of the dissenters in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
(1978). The fact that courts of law have accepted Dodgson as a specialist in created words and
the signification of meaning, along with a realization that he was able to verifiably affect our
lexicon leads us to recognize him as a language specialist, which, in turn, leads us to investigate
what Dodgson has contributed to our understanding of language.

16

CHAPTER III
DON’T FORGET THE PORPOISE:
THE RHETORICAL DODGSON

Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of
rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations
and makes a universe for them to describe?
—Stephen Hawking, “A Brief History of Time”
Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland (AIW) and Through the Looking Glass
(TLG), has altered our language and our understanding of language. While most people do not
fully understand the impact Carroll has had on our communicative system, they do recognize
Carroll as the creator of words and worlds because they have either read the Alices or have seen,
read, or heard at least one of the various constructions birthed from Carroll’s intellectual matrix.
But those who are most familiar with Carroll’s intellectual matrix realize that it belonged to a
man named Rev. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, a man who “was conscientious, meticulous,
fastidious, pedantic” (Pudney 15), a man whose entire existence revolved around logic and
symbols. We should not truly be surprised that the created worlds of Dodgson also revolve
around symbols and logic. Moreover, we should not be surprised that this concern for symbols
and logic manifested itself as a commentary on our communicative system. We cannot
productively communicate without a thorough understanding of the symbols that constitute our
language (graphemes) or a logical (or sensible) way to employ these symbols as building blocks
(morphemes) or as structures (utterances employed in phrasal context). Dodgson was a man who

desired order and dwelt on logic and symbols, a man who understood language well enough to
create morphemes and utterances that filled a perceived gap in our language. Therefore, it should
not be surprising that his fictive discourses explore our communicative system.
While very few have recognized Dodgson as a theorist in his own right, many have
certainly recognized his texts as ideologically significant. It may seem odd to call children’s tales
“ideologically significant,” but the Alices meet the requirements set forth by Mikhail Bakhtin for
a creation worthy of serious consideration:
In each period of historical existence, a work must enter into close
association with the changing behavioral ideology, become
permeated with it, and draw new sustenance from it. Only to the
degree that a work can enter into that kind of integral, organic
association with the behavioral ideology of a given period is it
viable for that period (and, of course, for a given social group).
Outside its connection with behavioral ideology it ceases to exist,
since it ceases to be experienced as something ideologically
meaningful. (Marxism 1219)
AIW and TLG entered an “integral, organic association” with ideology almost immediately after
their first publications. And theorists are dancing with them still. From Frege to Wittengenstein
to Richards, we find evidence of a tryst with Dodgson’s creations. Many theorists have explored
the wor(l)ds of Alice and/or the various letters, pamphlets, and texts created by this famous
author who desired an orderly, logical existence. However, a relative few have considered either
AIW or TLG as texts that quite thoroughly investigate our communicative systems, as texts that
contain concrete examples of the matter that lies at the heart of both linguistic and rhetorical
theory: verbal confusion.
Theory may be logically applied to and even located in the fictional works of Dodgson
because fiction has been located as rhetoric by Wayne Booth, as explicative of speech genre by
Mikhail Bakhtin, and as a natural form of speech act by Mary Louise Pratt. Yet, few theorists
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have moved past a marginal mention or frame-building approach when it comes to the worlds of
Alice, a fact recognized by Robin Lakoff. We may assume that the Alices have not been
thoroughly studied as rhetoric or speech genre or speech acts as other fictive representations have
because they have been falsely deemed nonsense (in the gibberish sense) or because they are
children’s literature; however, AIW is relatively more recognizable as speech act because of the
nature of its creation, as well as the recognizable intratextual speech acts that serve as the theme
of the text.
Pratt’s take on authorship allows us to apply speech act theory to any text: “an author is
implied in a text only in the same way subjects are applied in any speech act they perform” (64).
We find this take is especially applicable to AIW because we know that Dodgson created his text
after creating these tales for and relating them to Alice Liddell and other children he knew.
Moreover, speech-act can be seen at work in the conversations occurring within the worlds of
Alice, as well. The Gricean Cooperative Principle13, a bedrock of speech-act theory, is quite
conducive to the overall message that arises through the verbal interactions in AIW and TLG. A
careful consideration of speech acts within Dodgson’s fiction reveals that Dodgson would agree
with the four Gricean maxims: speech should be (1) necessary, (2) truthful, (3) relevant, and (4)
logical (Pratt 64-65), even if it is humorous. Pratt finds that most of everyday language falls
outside the Gricean principle (70); however, Dodgson shows us differently, as he offers concrete
examples of everyday language that lacks one or more of the Gricean maxims and demonstrates
that principle-free everyday language results in confusion and/or conflict. Based on Pratt’s take
of fiction as speech act and representations of speech-act within the texts, we find that Dodgson’s
text is the perfect example of Pratt’s theory on fictive discourse.
13

Created by Paul Grice.
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All in all, Pratt finds representative discourses are “world-creating, world-describing and
world-changing undertakings” (71), and therefore must be speech acts. Pratt’s description of
representative discourse sounds suspiciously like a description of AIW and TLG, but it also
sounds similar to Bakhtin’s and Booth’s theories of fiction. Pratt seemingly conjures up Booth
when she maintains that “authorship is no more, and no less, than another of the many ways a
subject realizes itself through speech” (64). Booth makes this clear when he asserts that “we
think of the writer as someone who addresses us, who wants to be read, and who does what he
can to be readable” (105). And Pratt communes with Bakhtin when she asserts that speech act
theory allows us to view “language as a social practice” (60), which is, of course, Ferdinand de
Saussure’s take on semiology14, as well. Overall, Pratt, along with Booth and Bakhtin, allows us
to move Dodgson’s fiction from the frame and into the big picture. Through Pratt we can freely
and unabashedly spy the various theoretical materials that color AIW and TLG.
J. B. Priestley saw the big picture when he announced in 1921 that he feared the
impending flood of Freudian-induced literary critics that would invade the worlds of Alice once
the German translation of Carroll’s work was released 15, thereby drawing attention away from
the essence of the work. Priestley had recognized the logical and rhetorical nature of the Alices
and feared that nature would be tainted with inappropriate applications of unrelated theory.
Priestley’s statement may now be seen as prophetic or as a catalyst for what he feared. Either
way, in 1961, Patricia Spacks had declared that “the questions raised by what most critics call
Carroll’s ‘word-play’ are the questions of modern philosophers” (274), but the cacophony of the

14

“Semiology is ‘a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life’” (Saussure 15).

15

Priestley did believe that he was referring to the first German translation of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland;
however, the first German translation was published in 1869: Alice’s Abenteuer im Wonderland.

20

psychoanalysis, psychedelic, and just plain psycho that had crashed into Alice’s world had
drowned out Spacks’s logical assertion. That Freudian theory may be found in a book that does
not mention psychoanalysis or the subconscious and was written by a man who was neither
psychoanalyzed nor discussed his subconscious is debatable. However, that linguistic and
rhetorical theory should be found in books that revolve around communicative acts is a certainty.
And we can recognize this certainty through a brief consideration of the theorists who have used
Dodgson’s fiction to explicate linguistic and rhetorical theory.
In “A Note on Humpty Dumpty,” Priestley maintains “Humpty Dumpty and his kind
pester us with their uncouth and inappropriate terms so that they may be spared the labor of
thought and yet may convey the impression of great profundity” (265). Contrariwise, Jean
Jacques Lecercle, through his consideration of Dr. Ettelson’s approach to AIW16, comes to the
conclusion that a Humpty Dumpty approach to life allows us to reach new levels of
understanding. While one treatment renders the figure as ignorant and the other as intelligent, the
essence of the figure is the same in both treatments:
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In “Lewis Carroll and the Talmud,” Jean Jacques Lecercle discusses the madness of scholars who find within the
worlds of Alice whatever essence it is they seek. Apparently, Dr. Ettelson claims that Alice in Wonderland “is a
cryptogram” based on the Talmud (Lecercle 210), an interpretation that Lecercle initially found to be “profoundly
unfaithful to Carroll” (208). However, Lecercle comes to realize that Ettelson may have actually been faithful to
Dodgson’s style, as Ettelson is able to draw upon the essence of Dodgson by looking at his own world through the
looking glass (208). By applying Dodgson’s works to “the tradition of the midrash,” Lecercle finds that Ettelson’s
approach is not as mad as it initially seems, because Lecercle is certain that Carroll would have approved of the
drive to “explain everything, even the punctuation” (Lecercle 210). Lecercle’s consideration of Ettelson’s
interpretation leads him to realize that we are all just “disciple[s] of Humpty-Dumpty” (213).
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Humpty Dumpty17 makes words mean what he wants them to mean whether they signify
meaning for anyone else or not. Humpty Dumpty serves to exemplify a profound personal belief
held by the Rev. Charles Dodgson: “No discussion, between two persons, can be of any use, until
each knows clearly what it is that the other asserts” (The Letters 1122). This Dodgsonian dictum
is certainly logical in and of itself, but we also find it to be the heart of Bakhtin’s theory about
“the sociological nature of the structure of expression and experience”: “The claim can be made
that it is a matter not so much of expression accommodating itself to our inner world but rather
of our inner world accommodating itself to the potentialities of our expression” (Marxism 1218).
Obviously, if we wish to convey meaning to other communicants; we must choose the words that
will signify to others the meaning that we wish to convey.
Unfortunately, we find the Dodgsonian dictum about speech participants achieving
mutual understanding was overlooked in the creation of Kenneth Burke’s “From ‘The Thinking
of the Body’: Comments on the Imagery of Catharsis in Literature.” After announcing that he
will use Carroll as a spying glass lens during his inspection of catharsis, Burke appears to bypass
catharsis and delivers AIW through a Freudian lens, focusing on some imagined “anal-oral
reversibility” (342), which is not solidified in his article or in the texts. Interestingly, Burke
mentions the Queen’s “‘Sentence first—verdict afterwards’” right before “the circling about the
table” (343) and never sees the motive for Dodgson’s rhetoric. Burke, like Humpty Dumpty, has
made words mean what he wants them to mean, regardless of the author’s motives, providing us
17

Humpty Dumpty tells us that a name must mean something (TLG 224), that words can mean what you want them
to mean (TLG 229), and that you must master words in order to make them do as you please (TLG 230). Alice feels
Humpty Dumpty treats conversation as a game (TLG 226), which, in essence, he does, as he is always trying to get
the upper hand and to point out Alice’s incorrect use of words (TLG 226). Yet, his lack of mastery is reflected in his
attempts to explain the words used in “Jabberwocky” and to create his own poetry (TLG 231-34).

with an example of the psychobabble that Priestley foretold. Not all theorists, not even all
rhetorical theorists, have recognized Dodgson’s fiction as illustrations of the verbal confusion
that lies at the heart of rhetorical theory. However, many theorists have noted the sense of
concreteness that Dodgson affords us with his witty and entertaining take on ineffective
communication, where Humpty Dumpty is just one of the participants that reveals how our
attempts to communicate can go awry.
In “Logic and Language in Through the Looking-Glass,” Spacks identifies the Humpty
Dumpty problem: “with the Humpty Dumpty method of dealing with words we find a solipsistic
approach to semantics” (271). The extreme self-focus that lies at the heart of the solipsistic
approach allows Humpty Dumpty and his disciples to disregard a larger concern for
signification, as the only thing that matters is making words mean what the speaker wants them
to mean. This solipsistic approach further disregards a larger concern for contextual
appropriateness or pragmatic skills, as speech interaction takes on a geocentric-like model, with
the self as the center of the speech universe. Spacks is able to recognize the solipsistic approach
of Humpty Dumpty because she recognizes a larger concern for language and rhetorical theory
within TLG, where we are led to believe that communicants who take a Humpty Dumpty
approach to language are not likely to convey meaning.
Priestley and Spacks are not the only two who have returned from Dodgson’s “fanstastic”
worlds and found them brimming with linguistic and rhetorical concerns; many scholars have
returned from Dodgson’s created worlds with the understanding that the issues with our
communicative systems is “what Alice found there.” Even those scholars who have chosen to
focus on Dodgson the logician/mathematician recognize a concern for language in the Alices. For
instance, Robin Wilson recognizes Dodgson’s focus on language, which she relates to the
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author’s logic-inclined psyche. To prove her point, Wilson reprints scenes in which she senses
the “logical and philosophical absurdities [that] permeate the Alice books” (5). Unfortunately,
she does not explain why the scenes are logical or philosophical or absurdities. However, she
does reminds us that Dodgson, the logician, has taken up matters of language in other texts as
well, such as What the Tortoise Said to Achilles where Dodgson’s take on Zeno’s paradox18 was
so impressive that it later caused Bertrand Russell to describe it as one of “Dodgson’s greatest
contributions to logic” (Wilson 196). Wilson’s treatment of Dodgson—the mathematician
concerned with language—does reveal much about how Carroll would approach language:
addressing the “Circe-Squarer,” Dodgson made it clear that “‘we cannot waste our time in
listening to anyone who does not accept the ordinary data of the subject’” (as qtd. in
Numberland 100). And, in the subject at hand, we find the ordinary data has been taken up by
those who also see the linguistic and rhetorical themes of the Alices, as well as the theorist who
created them.
Spacks certainly finds TLG to be a text that revolves around language concerns and
categorizes the entire theme of the work as “the question of meaning and the question of value”
(273 - 274). For instance, she employs I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden’s The Meaning of Meaning
to marry Carrollian nursery rhymes to the force of language: “Tweedledum and Tweedledee
fight over their rattle not because they want to [ . . . ], the rhyme says they do, and therefore they
must (Spacks 272). In other words, the utterances are more powerful than the speaker—which
answers Humpty Dumpty’s rhetorical question: “which is to be master?” (TLG 230)—the
speaker or the spoken. Spacks does show us how Dodgson’s texts can and have been used to
18

Zeno’s paradox: “Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same
things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?” (Socrates as qtd. in
Phaedrus 157).
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explain theory, but she goes one step further and gives us a glimpse of Dodgson the theorist
when she points out that TLG “seems disorderly [because it] is a condemnation of the ordinary
sloppy thinking of the reader and the sloppy traditions of his language” (269). Spacks tells us the
real reason we can view Dodgson as not just the illustrator of theories that arose after his
publications, but as theorist in his own right: “Carroll’s world of fantasy is most profoundly, in
its semantic aspects at least, the sort of world for which such a logician as Charles Dodgson
might yearn: a world of truth and order” (269). While Spacks recognizes Dodgson’s inextricable
quest for order and his obvious theme of language, she mistakenly places the order, logic, and
rule obsessed Dodgson at home in a world where verbal confusion actually leads to a continual
state of chaos and confusion. But, most important to this study, Spacks links Dodgson to
Richards and Ogden for good reason. When closely considering the words and phrases employed
by Dodgson—within the speech contexts presented in AIW and TLG—we find that Dodgson
does exactly what Richards and Ogden would call for over a half of a century later: focuses
attention “to those [forms of verbal confusion] that are more subtle and more frequent” (The
Meaning 1276). In essence, he ferrets out the words and phrases that cause communication
problems, compelling us to consider our language, or speech, more closely. Therefore, it is not
surprising that both Robin Lakoff and Daniel Kirk have not shied away from assigning Dodgson
to a specific rhetorical theory camp, although they have differing opinions on the camp to which
he should be assigned.
In “Lewis Carroll: Subversive Pragmaticist,” Lakoff takes the same view as Spacks when
it comes to Dodgson’s interpretation of “which is to be master”: “Alice is [ . . . ] a protoWhorfian: her language creates not only her perception of reality, but her own and everyone
else’s actual reality” (381). However, Lakoff rebuilds our solipsistic Humpty Dumpty and gives
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him a nice, new pragmatic19 shell. In fact, Lakoff uses Dodgson’s fiction to argue for a new
pragmatics in general, and she does this by turning the worlds of Alice into Pragmaticland,
giving us a Humpty Dumpty that views language as a human commodity that can be changed at
will (372), instead of a Humpty Dumpty that has no concern for whether or not his speech
partner can create meaning from his words. Lakoff does note that Dodgson is, in essence,
questioning the sensibility of our language rules (368), but she also finds that Dodgson has
offered a Catch 22 of sorts: upon leaving these worlds a decision must be made between the
belief that language that is wholly arbitrary or in an adherence to illogical rules in order to
systematize language (368 - 369). Of course, she problematizes her main assertions by further
claiming that “the book inverts his, and our, reality” (369), which can be taken as a negation of
the Catch 22 assumption. Nonetheless, most important to this study is Lakoff’s belief that
Dodgson the pragmatist shines through the Alices, revealing our understanding of languages to
be faulty but “rational and meaningful because they are shared” (384), as well as her declaration
of Dodgson “as a pragmaticist before there was pragmatics” (369).
Lakoff feels Dodgson is able to fully illustrate a pragmatic approach toward language
because he employs Alice to illustrate the irrationality of ordinary language practices (383). On
the other hand, Dodgson’s treatment of ordinary language has led Kirk to assign Dodgson the
label of semiotician. In Charles Dodgson, Semeiotician Kirk presents the same image of a
rhetorical theorist at play; however, Kirk sees that play as illustrative of a different school of
thought than Lakoff. Since the semiotician is ultimately concerned with “any system of signs
19

In her study of Dodgson, Lakoff gives the following definitions for pragmatics: “I like to define pragmatics as ‘the
interesting stuff about language’—the reason many of us were attracted to linguistics. We wanted to know how
language did the things it did, to us and for us; why some people used it to get their needs met, and others to get into
various kinds of trouble; why using language was sometimes fun, and sometimes frightening” (367); and “as the
field concerned with the communicative assumptions shared by humans as members of a society or culture” (378).
However, she does clarify that she does not find “any rigorous definition” of pragmatics to be desirable (369).
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which can be used in some communicative function” (Kirk 1-2), it is not surprising that the
author of arithmetical texts would be associated with such theories. Kirk certainly locates math
and logic in the Alices (39-40), but he also testifies to the all-encompassing approach to language
that can be located in Dodgson’s work: a focus on symbols and signs as the foundation of our
language systems (74). While Kirk notices the internalized drive Dodgson possessed “to clarify
the issues20 by clarifying the language in which they were expressed” (29) and “a new dimension
in developing the importance of language” in Dodgson’s other works of fiction (48), he marks
the Alice books with a white stone because he finds in them the evidence that Dodgson was a
revolutionary theorist: “experience as a test of meaning is emphasized by the problem of whether
cats eats bats, [and] was published thirteen years before Charles Sanders Peirce’s famous article,
‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’” (59). Overall, Kirk assigns Dodgson a foundational role akin to
the one Lakoff has for pragmatics. However, Kirk’s claim that Dodgson meant to “liberate us
from the bondage of the one-word-one-meaning attitude which holds each of us from time to
time in mental check” (72) resulting in his belief that “Dodgson must have been free from
language” (75) is at odds with what we know of the man who felt that rules were both necessary
and desired, the man who owned over 40 dictionaries (Library), the man who created the
stipulative definition: “Any writer may mean exactly what he pleases by a phrase so long as he
explains it beforehand” (The Letters 610).
Dodgson’s desire for order is also noted by Gilles DeLeuze in The Logic of Sense, where
he posits Dodgson in an ancient rhetorical regime we call stoicism (9). This linking of Dodgson’s
writings to stoicism is most evident when we recognize that the stoics concerned themselves with
the correctness of our deductive analyses or the use of speech to convey accuracy (Cicero 325).
20

Kirk is referring to Dodgson’s publications on women studies, vivisection, damnation, etc.
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It is interesting to consider the effects of rhetorical schools on Dodgson, given the number of
books on philosophy and logic that were found in his library after he had passed on; he had
possessed works by Locke, Bacon, Pope, Mill, Keynes, Aristotle, and Cicero—at least four lots
were auctioned off that contained works by Cicero (Library). Whether Dodgson illustrates or
parodies the stoics, he does illustrate what occurs when the accuracy of the proposition (or
signifier) is demanded, as DeLeuze has acknowledged.
Like Lakoff and Kirk, DeLeuze places Dodgson in a revolutionary position when he
credits Dodgson with “the first great mise en scène of the paradoxes of sense” (xiii), but
DeLeuze does not label Dodgson, nor does he place the creator of Alice at the revolutionary end
of a new rhetorical order. In his treatment of the White Knight’s discussion of “A-sitting on a
Gate,” Deleuze maintains that Dodgson is illustrating the infinite proliferation of verbal entities
(n1n2n3n4. . . ) 21: “The series, [which] taken in its regressive sense, may be extended to
infinity in the alteration of a real name and a name which designates this reality” (30). Whether
or not this infinite struggle for truthful speech is a declaration of a stoic stance, it is certainly
representative of the Dodgson that can be located in all of his publications, the man who easily
recognized logical pitfalls. Either way, it serves as one of the numerous examples Dodgson, as
Carroll, has provided within the Alice books that reveals his obsession with ordinary language
and the theories that encircle it.
Deleuze chooses to frame his theoretical treatment of sense with Dodgson’s fiction
because he “find[s] that Carroll’s entire logical work is directly about signification” and that
21

“The name of the song is called ‘Haddocks’Eyes.’ ‘Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?’ Alice said, trying to
feel interested. [ . . . .] ‘That’s what the name is called . The name is really ‘The Aged, Aged Man.’ ‘Then I ought to
have said, “That’s what the song is called?”’ Alice corrected herself. ‘No you oughtn’t; that’s quite another thing!
The song is called “Ways and Means”; but that’s only what it’s called, you know!’ ‘Well, what is the song then?’
said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered. ‘I was coming to that,’ the Knight said. ‘The song really is
‘A-sitting on a Gate.’” (TLG 263)
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“everything that takes place occurs in and by means of language” (22). Furthermore, Deleuze
spotlights “Carroll’s paradox” as Frege’s paradox; however, Deleuze does not draw attention to
the fact that Frege did not publish his paradox until 1892, twenty-one years after Dodgson
exemplified the infinite proliferation of verbal entities in TLG (29). It is interesting that Deleuze
thoroughly investigates Dodgson’s impact on the theory of signification without applying his
equation for the infinite proliferation of verbal entities (n1n2n3n4. . . ) to Dodgson himself,
as Lakoff22 and Kirk have done: Rev. Charles Lutwidge DodgsonlogicianLewis
Carrollchildren’s authorrhetorical theoristpragmatist (or semitoician).
The fact that Dodgson is a theorist should not be a disputed fact. Since Dodgson gives us
“comparisons between the meaning of words,” and Richards declares that “The whole business
of rhetoric comes down to comparisons between the meanings of words” (The Philosophy 1286),
we can assign Dodgson’s work as an exploration of rhetorical concerns 23. We certainly can see
that Alice’s experiences exemplify what happens when meaning is not conveyed as intended;
they exemplify what happens when signification goes awry, whether it is because of the incorrect
use of words or the complicated nature of words or the way the words are delivered (and in what
context). Dodgson has given us a tool for the illustration of theories because he was both muse to
the theorists that would follow him and theorist.

22

Lakoff sees the proliferation of verbal entities as “the Knight’s insist[ance] on distinctions” that are not required
“by the normal rules of everyday conversation” (377).
23

Collingwood recognizes that, above all else, Dodgson is concerned with meaning: “The humour [of the Alice
books] [ . . . ] is the acute sense of paradox which revels in [ . . . ] the habit of playing with words which is built
upon an accurate conception of their proper use” (Diversions 3-4). Moreover, Dodgson understood rhetoric well
enough to determine the failings of other authors; for instance, Dodgson felt Kingsley’s Alton Locke was lacking
definition that would have allowed it to “stir up many fellow-workers in the same good field of social improvement”
(Pudney 58).

29

While the number of theorists and scholars who have employed Dodgson’s fictive
representations as illustrations of language concerns is grossly under-represented here, sufficient
material has been presented, allowing us to conclude that the Alices have been under-appreciated
as ideologically meaningful texts that aid our knowledge of how communicative systems work.
Deleuze, for one, assures us that Dodgson has given us children’s literature with a “porpoise” 24:
Carroll’s entire logical work is directly about signification,
implications, and conclusions, and only indirectly about sense—
precisely, through the paradoxes which signification does not
resolve, or indeed which it creates. (22)
Certainly, signification is the larger concern being explored in “A Caucus Race and A Long
Tale,” where we find the Mouse to be signifying that his family’s tale (story) was “long and
sad,” but Alice considers the signified to be the Mouse’s actual tail—causing her to be baffled by
the adjectives the Mouse has used (AIW 25).
In the Alice books we find plentiful evidence of a theoretical mind at work, as Dodgson
examines such topics as syllogisms, abstraction, pragmatic social skills, and stigmatization. An
Aristotelian theme can be located in AIW, where the Pigeon assumes Alice is a snake based on
faulty syllogism: after being told that “‘little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do,’” the
Pigeon has deduced that “‘if they do, why, then they’re a kind of serpent’” (AIW 52). While
some may find the Pigeon’s faulty syllogism to be a mere grasp at humor, we cannot understand
the humor unless we understand the theory being parodied. Furthermore, the abstractness of
language is taken up when the Dormouse asks if Alice has ever seen “‘such a thing as a drawing
of a muchness?’” (AIW 77). We find that Alice has finally learned what is required of certain

24

“’No wise fish would go anywhere without a porpoise.’ ‘Wouldn’t it really?’ said Alice in a tone of great surprise.
‘Of course not,’ said the Mock Turtle. ‘Why, if a fish came to me, and told me he was going on a journey, I should
say, ‘With what porpoise?’” (AIW 109).
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speech genres when she stops herself from telling the Mock Turtle that she has eaten one of his
friends: “‘I’ve often seen them at din—’” (AIW 107). And Alice’s adventures with the Fawn help
us to consider stigmatization through language, as the Fawn was walking happily with Alice
until they left “the wood where things have no names” (AIW 186).
The theorists previously discussed have also extracted evidence from the Alice books of a
man concerned with language. We find that DeLeuze shows us a “stoic” stance in the Knight’s
discussion of “A-Sitting on a Gate.” Robin Lakoff delivers a proto-Wharfian concern at work in
the King’s eating of the ham sandwich and hay (381), as Alice’s words have ensured the
occurrence. Kirk illuminates a pre-Peirce take on the question of “Do cats eat bats?” versus “Do
bats eat cats?” (58-59). We also find Dodgson’s theoretical approach to language has been taken
up by those who examine “Jabberwocky.” Referring to the translation problems that have arisen
with “Jabberwocky,” Lösel points out that “‘Lewis Carroll puts the translator into a difficult
position. He takes language at its word and uncovers secret relations between words’” (as qtd. by
Imholtz in “Latin and Greek” 212). Moreover, Richards’s utilization of “Jabberwocky” is meant
to solidify his argument that you can only get meaning within a sentence: “[this notion of a word
as being backed up by other words that are not uttered or thought of] is only recognizing on a
larger, wider scale the principle that Lewis Carroll was using in Jabberwocky” (The Philosophy
1293). Richards finds that we can understand “Jabberwocky,” even though it is full of created
words, because it exemplifies the need to consider all words as a group when contemplating
signification, which is, of course, a furthering of Ferdinand de Saussure’s syntagmatic theory—
the belief that words signify best when considered in succession or relation to one another. These
theorists do not merely serve as conduits for the linguistic and rhetorical concerns found within
the texts but also as witnesses that can speak to the theoretical nature of the texts.
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It may be difficult for some to see Dodgson as theorist because they see “play,” but his
type of play has been recognized as theory. Twenty-five years after the publication of Through
the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, Saussure likened language to chess. Saussure
uses chess to explain his synchronic theory of linguistics, which revolves around the fact that
“linguistic changes affect isolated elements only” (88), much like moving one piece on a
chessboard affects only the other pieces next to which it has been placed. Whether or not we find
a reasonable analogy has been created, Saussure allows us to easily visualize language as a game
that can be played.
Wolfgang Iser tells us that there are different reasons to play a game or different types of
games that can be played. For instance, agōn is a game of contest or struggle and alea is a game
where chance rules. Both types of games may be easily identified in Dodgson’s fiction, but we
find that Dodgson plays both types of games with the same pieces: utterances. In AIW, where
alea can be found, we find cards and Alice’s remarks on a lack of rules. Alice must maneuver
through her social interactions in Wonderland and figure out how to convey meaning in a
socially acceptable way without knowledge of a logical approach. In TLG, where agōn is
evident, Alice proceeds through a game of chess with a relegated approach; if Alice wants to be
queen in the Looking-glass world she must follow a certain path, which causes her to converse
with specific people. However, Alice is not able to converse sensibly with these people, even
though she is trying to follow their rules, because the rules are flawed. Both forms of play result
in realistic verbal confusion and social conflict; therefore, Dodgson has chosen the forms of play
that we are engaging in everyday when faced with the lacking or overly-prescriptive rules that
exist within our current communicative systems.
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Iser maintains that “there are already elements of both free and instrumental play in
games of conflict and of chance” (Armstrong 216), so it should not be surprising that Dodgson is
able to reveal the sort of language play that is just fun and the sort that reveals an underlying
issue. What is most interesting is that Dodgson does not offer us ilinx, which is a game that
“subvert[s] all fixed positions in order to induce vertigo” (Armstrong 217). This is most
obviously understood when we compare Dodgson’s dream worlds 25 to the ones found in movies
like Inception or What Dreams May Come, or even those in Shakespeare’s fiction. Both agōn
and alea are being played with utterances in the worlds of Alice, just as they are in our world
because Dodgson recognizes that they are both logically applicable to our everyday sociolinguistic conditions. Dodgson does play with language, but he plays language games that we
play all the time.
Dodgson shows us that, whether we approach our social interaction as intentional or
accidental, we will not be able to make meaningful moves through communication unless we
communicate logically. In our everyday communications we have to make certain movements in
order to convey meaning. If our movements are restricted because we do not know or forgot the
rules that allow us to move forward with meaningful conveyance (or because the rules are bad
and send us to the wrong spot on the rhetorical board), we cannot convey meaning in a profitable

25

Dodgson’s dream worlds make perfectly good sense because they are not meant to represent de-stabilizing worlds
and they do not engage in de-stabilizing games. Rather, they are meant to reveal as much of our reality as would be
found in a dream that results from a child’s concerns with language rules that are causing her (or him) issues on a
daily basis. It is important, however, not to get lost in the dream aspect. The dream aspect is not meant to take
center-stage, which is why the fact that Alice has been dreaming is not implied until the end of the story. The dream
aspect exists to provide a framework for play that reveals the inadequacies of our language rules (not our linguistic
structure, for which we need only to follow the existing rules).
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manner, which means we are likely to face the Duchess’s sentence, which most likely won’t
make sense26.
Dodgson realized that we could not solve our communication issues through
consideration of separate words because it is not the words themselves that are causing issues;
the issues arise from how, when, why, where we employ our words, which speaks to Saussure’s
assertion that a material object is only of value when “it takes on or becomes identified with its
value in the game” (108). For Saussure the individual morphemes can be replaced as long as the
replacement carries the same value as the original morpheme (109). Dodgson shows us that this
may not be the case. Saussure appears to have considered much of what Dodgson has obviously
considered; however, Saussure felt that we would greatly benefit from organizing grammar along
a syntagmatic and paradigmatic axis (135), while Dodgson appears to have taken our
understanding of this axis for granted and felt we would benefit from better language rules that
help us to avoid verbal confusion, chaos, and threats of being decapitated or buttered.
Dodgson shows what we already know, but what we do not always understand. We know
that we spoke to someone and that the conversation resulted in confusion or conflict, but we
rarely know that the reason this negative occurrence happened is due to the nature of our
communicative system, which is not logically regulated. This should not be surprising to the
rhetorical theorist, as Richards and Ogden take up the theme of rules in The Meaning of
Meaning:
It is not always new words that are needed, but a means of
controlling them as symbols, a means of readily discovering to
what in the world on any occasion they are used to refer, and this is
what an adequate theory of definition should provide. (1278)
26

An example of Zeno’s paradox.
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Dodgson’s fictive play allows us to recognize the real issues that have caused our
communication mishaps: we do not have a logical system for controlling the symbols in a way
that ensures signification routinely occurs as desired.
The play at work in the Alices is unquestionably a result of Dodgson’s logic driven mind.
He once wrote to you a young man named “Gaynor” to tell the boy that if he insisted on spelling
Dodgson without the “g” than Dodgson would have to start calling him ‘aynor. The logic behind
this playful remark is if we dispense with some of the Gs we must dispense with all of them—it
is only fair and would make much more sense. And the logic behind this playful remark is found
in Dodgson’s approach to argument, as is discussed in T.B. Strong’s “Lewis Carroll”:
If he argued, he was somewhat rigid and precise, carefully
examining the terms used, relentless in pointing out the logical
results of any position assumed by his opponent, and quick to
devise a puzzling case when he wanted to bring objections against
a rule of principle. But his skill lay rather in tracing consequences
than in criticizing fundamental assumptions. (11)
Strong recognizes Dodgson’s “play” in the Logic as an attempt to solidify meaning for words,
“as if they were mathematical symbols” (45). He recognizes Dodgson’s quest for a systematic
approach. Strong further cements the assertions of this study because he allows us to locate
Dodgson as theorist not because he offered straight-forward criticism of theories or approaches,
but because he traces the logical consequences of one approach or another, of one theory or
another. And one of the ways he does this is through the encasement of our communicative
attempts in a diorama that allows us to forego horological concerns: he offers us the types of
verbal confusion that result regardless of historical time period because they are inherent in our
communicative systems.
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What we learn from the Alices is that we must consider our language more carefully, as a
system. Saussure tells us that language rules are founded in tradition that has resulted from
arbitrary influences (74). Dodgson has recognized that language rules were not always created
from thoughtful and logical appropriation. Moreover, Dodgson realizes that we do not have
issues with rules in general, whether they are created arbitrarily or not, but we do have issues
with inconsistent or nonsensical rules; W.H. Auden takes up this notion in “Today’s ‘WonderWorld’ Needs Alice,” where he both recognizes the language theme and the desire for sense.
Auden, who recognizes that Dodgson is showing us language issues through the eyes of a child,
notes that Dodgson is revealing not a problem with rules themselves, but with the lack of a
consistent structure which results in a child (or a learner of language, as it were) not being able to
“perceive any law linking one command to another in a consistent pattern” (Auden 11). Through
Alice, Dodgson tells us that we must carefully observe our rules in action, not just to learn what
is expected of us verbally (as children must), but also to carefully consider our rules. After all, if
we are going to have language rules, they should be sensible rules that prevent verbal confusion.
What Alice found in Wonderland and the Looking-glass world is what we find there: the
verbal confusion that arises when signification does not occur as intended. Alice is the voice of
the fledgling human who is trying to understand why she (or he) is not able to communicate
effectively with others. She serves to remind us that language does not come from a prioiri
knowledge but from a posteriori knowledge.
The Alices are epistemological in that they show us how we know what we know about
language and communication. Alice tells us that manners are not learned through sermonic
instruction; we learn manners, for the most part, by observing others and by experimenting with
interactions until we learn how to communicate without being rude (or how rudeness occurs)
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and/or until we learn how to avoid the verbal confusion that causes conflict and chaos. Dodgson
is offering us empirical knowledge of our language because Alice’s experiences with language
are based on Dodgson’s perceptual observations of communication. If our knowledge of
language is constructed through interaction and personal observation, how do we avoid the
conflict that can be caused through verbal faux pas before we commit them? We can observe the
interactions between others that result in conflict and learn from those (as children do) because
Dodgson has offered us an it-is construction, one that allows us to learn about communication
through observation, not through dry, unrelatable lectures.
The creator of the Alices gave us an entertaining and enlightening tale that was meant to
convey the knowledge of our communicative systems, most especially that of English, where
“’Language is worth a thousand pounds a word!’” (TLG 178) and the verbs are stubborn:
“’adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs’” (TLG 230). Through his theoretical play,
Dodgson gives us perfect illustrations of language issues—illustrations that can be used while
explaining rhetorical theory to adults, as well as teaching both language arts and rhetoric to
children.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CARROLLIAN ART OF LANGUAGE

The arts are made great [ . . . ] by those who are able to discover
all of the resources which each art affords.
—Isocrates, “Against the Sophists”
Almost immediately after its release, Alice in Wonderland was marketed and treated as a
lesson book in English and German (Collingwood 107). This is not surprising given that Alice in
Wonderland (AIW) and Through the Looking Glass (TLG)27 represent Dodgson’s obvious
commentary on ineffective communication and language, most specifically the English
language28. Dodgson’s ability to humorously comment on language and how it is used has
enabled him to provide excellent tools for talking to students about the complexities and
problems we encounter with language every day.
Because Dodgson has provided us with humorous literature that addresses language,
speech, and other communication issues, Dodgson has provided us with a useful instructional
tool; however, AIW and TLG have been grossly over-looked by today’s language arts teachers. In
a recent investigation of how many Tennessee State standards may be addressed by
incorporating AIW and TLG as instructional tools, I was not surprised to find that most of the
27

Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Saw There are now more
commonly known as Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, and they are often published together in
one book, as was the case with the Kingsport Press edition used in this study.
28

What is English? “’Fiddle-dee-dee’s not English,’ Alice replied gravely” (TLG 275). When should it be used?
‘’Speak in French when you can’t think of the English for a thing’” (TLG 175). Are you speaking English? “’I
speaks English, doesn’t I?’” (TLG 281).

Eighth Grade Language Arts standards29 might be addressed through a reading of the Alice
books. Based on readability tests, AIW and TLG may be utilized in an eighth grade classroom, as
they should be considered appropriate instructional level materials for both students at and
slightly below grade level expectations: Alice in Wonderland has been rated as eighth grade
reading material according to Laesbarhedsindex (LIX), Rate Index (RIX), and Fry tests, and
Through the Looking Glass has been rated as seventh grade reading material according to New
Dale-Chall, Fry, and Raygor Estimate tests.
Tennessee lists 82 language arts standard performance indicators (SPIs) that the 8 th grade
student must tackle, such as “SPI 0801.1.2 Identify the correct use of verbs within context”
(“Tennessee English”). Obviously, almost any book could be employed to teach and to evaluate
the skill of identifying parts of speech within context; therefore, it is not surprising that the Alice
books would satisfy all such SPIs (SPI 0801.1.1-SPI 0801.1.7 and SPI 0801.1.9-SPI 0801.1.12).
However, the Alice books can be used as tools to achieve almost all the Tennessee 8th grade
language arts SPIs, with the possible exception of a mere eleven. Moreover, it is the best choice
for addressing certain SPIs, such as “SPI 0801.8.8 Analyze figurative language within context”
(“Tennessee English”). In line with Quintilian’s proposal that rhetoric—“The art of using
language effectively so as to persuade or influence others, [ . . . ]; the study of principles and
rules to be followed by a speaker or writer striving for eloquence” (OED)—should be taught
from a young age, as and when grammar is taught, the language arts material provided by
Dodgson—within his fantastical works—may also be considered appropriate illustrations of not
only language arts concerns, but also of how we communicate.

29

“Tennessee English Language Arts Standards, Grade 8” (Effective 2009-2010).
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Verbal Confusion
Verbal confusion and other language-related problems are experienced by everyone who
tries to communicate with another being, and it starts with speech used every day without any
thought given to the words employed: figures of speech. Dodgson addresses many of the
problematic figures of speech that have been adopted by English speakers world-wide. Alice
almost drowns in her tears (AIW 17) because she, like most English speaking children, was told
at one time or another to stop crying or she would “drown in her tears,” which, of course, is
physically improbable. Dodgson draws attention to another improbability when Alice decides
she won’t ask for information because she may “‘see it written up somewhere’” (AIW 4); this
statement violates our normative use of metaphor, as we would say we might “see it written
down somewhere,” but Alice’s version actually makes more sense because we generally do not
look down for signs, we look up. The same conundrum is found when Alice, after a slate comes
off the roof and falls towards the creatures on the ground, overhears the creatures yelling
“‘Heads below!’” (AIW 36); once again we have more sensical speech that violates our common
understanding of the phrases we employ routinely, as we would most certainly have said, “Heads
Up!”
Quintilian instructs teachers to “distinguish words that are [. . .] misapplied, or used
contrary to the rules of language” (66 – 67). One reason Quintilian may have felt that contrarily
used words are worth our time and attention is the conflict that can arise from application. The
conflict that arises from verbal confusion is illustrated through Dodgson’s numerous examples of
problematic figures of speech, where inherent idiosyncrasies and the issues they create are the
focus of Dodgson’s rhetoric. The Mad Hatter is obviously being accused of actually “killing
time” when the Queen says “‘He’s murdering the time!’” (AIW 74). And the King should not
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really make sense when he uses the common expression “‘stand down,’” which is why the Mad
Hatter responds with “‘I can’t go no lower [ . . . ] I’m on the floor, as it is’” (AIW 121). No
comment on problematic sayings is complete without considering the universal “‘I didn’t
mean—’” (TLG 272); therefore, we should not be surprised when the Red Queen reprimands
Alice for employing this phrase: “‘That’s just what I complain of! You should have meant!’”
(TLG 272). Why speak if you do not mean what you say? We do it all the time; we say “I could
care less” when we mean “I couldn’t care less,” and we say “I see” when we mean “I understand
you”: “‘Only I don’t sing it,’ [Humpty Dumpty] added as an explanation. ‘I see you don’t,’ said
Alice. ‘If you can see whether I’m singing or not, you’ve sharper eyes than most’” (TLG 233). In
Dodgson’s illustrations we find that the misapplied words cause anger and irritation, but the
misapplied words are also being used in accordance with accepted language traditions (or rules).
In essence, Dodgson is pointing out that Quintilian is right, except the misapplied words are not
being used contrary to our rules; they are a part of our accepted rules or language traditions. The
logic that has led to these supposed “nonsensical” conversations reveals the nonsense we are
encountering as our own; after all, Alice is using the words and phrases we use every day, and
she is most often the one saying things that do not make sense. Dodgson has given us a way to
speak to students about the “misapplied” words that we believe we are applying correctly and
how they affect the understanding of those who hear our message, as well as how they can result
in a response that we did not expect nor do we understand, which of course results in ineffective
communication, as the communication process is likely to break down once one of the parties is
too angry to participate in a productive conversation.
Other authors have commented on the common sayings that have proven nonsensical, but
none have done so with the humorous flair of Dodgson: “‘Where’s the servant whose business it
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is to answer the door?’ [Alice] began angrily. [ . . . . ] ‘To answer the door?’ [the Frog] said.
‘What’s it been asking of?’” (TLG 280). These examples of figurative language can be used to
explain figures of speech, which Quintilian found advisable (66-67), and to cover Tennessee SPI
0801.8.8: “analyze figurative language,” which basically equates to identifying and defining
these terms. Furthermore, examples like these are ludic in that “the aim [of their usage] is not
primarily to communicate meaning but to draw attention to the way the normal rules of language
can be bent or broken to convey novel effects” (Crystal 464), which places them in the realm of
pathos, as a comedic appeal is a pathetic appeal because it works on our emotions. And if we feel
emotionally invested, we are more likely to empathize, which results in our openness to the
transformation (or educative process) that the author desires 30. That Dodgson desires the
education of his readership should not be surprising; after all, it is the base assertion of Patricia
Spacks, who claims that “Alice’s adventures are an educative process” (272).

Unnecessary Speech
Dodgson’s lesson on ineffective speech is not relegated only to figures of speech but
touches almost every aspect of verbal confusion that can result from currently existing rules that
are either illogical or are not being followed, such as those rules that address the problematic or
unnecessary quantifier. How can we take more of something if we have had none? “‘I’ve had
nothing yet,’ Alice replied in an offended tone, ‘so I can’t take some more.’ ‘You mean, you
can’t take less,’ said the Hatter; ‘it’s very easy to take more than nothing’” (AIW 75). Dodgson
makes it clear that we can take more. Dodgson, ever the mathematician, also finds fault with
trying to expand on the idea of nothing, as nothing is the equivalent of zero: “‘Nothing,’ said
30

“We see the value of empathy and understanding as the only real means to achieve the common ground necessary
for any truly transformative process” (O’Brien 87).
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Alice. ‘Nothing whatever?’ persisted the King” (AIW 125). Of course, the King is in essence
asking Alice if she is certain she is telling the truth, but that is not what he has said; what he has
said and what he means are two different things, which explains the obsession of Dodgson’s
characters with saying what you mean and meaning what you say.
While some of these commentaries on the problematic or unnecessary quantifier are
presented in a form that requires inference, some are stated outright: “‘I am seven and a half,
exactly.’ ‘You needn’t say “exactly,”’ the Queen remarked” (TLG 213). Dodgson’s characters
reveal the conflict that can arise from words employed in a contrary fashion or in an expected
fashion that leads to contrary understandings; therefore, these examples that lead to conflict can
be used to “identify the kind(s) of conflict present in a literary plot,” which allows for the
exploration of Tennessee SPI 0801.8.10, as students can certainly recognize the person vs.
person, person vs. self, or person vs. environment situations that arise because of problematic
communication.

Syntax and Semantics
In his Alice books, Dodgson is able to comment upon almost every aspect of speech, so it
is not surprising that he includes the major elements of linguistic concern: semantics and syntax.
Syntax is obviously important; words must appear in a certain order for them to make sense and
be understood. If we want to know the answer to “‘Do cats eat bats?’” we cannot ask “‘Do bats
eats cats?’” (AIW 4) We cannot move words around without losing the intended meaning, or can
we? “‘For the Duchess. An invitation from the Queen to play croquet.’ [ . . . ] ‘From the Queen.
An invitation for the Duchess to play croquet’” (AIW 55). Apparently, sometimes we can and
sometimes we cannot, as Dodgson has evidenced. And, sometimes, when we move the words
43

around we do not just say something nonsensical, we say something quite humorous: “‘I’ve often
seen a cat without a grin,’ thought Alice; ‘but a grin without a cat!’” 31 (AIW 67). Alice’s
experiences reveal that the placement of our words affects our message—especially if you want
to “‘say what you mean’” (AIW 69); they also correlate with Ferdinand de Saussure’s assertion
that external factors do not affect internal rules (23), as even falling down a rabbit-hole does not
change the fact that words must be presented in a prescribed order if they are to convey meaning.
Dodgson’s treatment of semantics leads us to a better understanding of the rhetorical and
philosophical discourse that has accumulated over the years in regards to signification. The King
in AIW is found verbally trying on words: “‘Important—unimportant—unimportant—
important’” (AIW 127). This seems useless because he must use the one that relays the message
he is trying to impart, unless the King can make words mean what he wants them to mean, like
Humpty Dumpty does:
“There’s glory for you!”
“I don’t what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—
till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knockdown argument for
you.’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knockdown argument,’” Alice
objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean
so many different things.” (TLG 229)
Even though Alice is only a child, she understands that we cannot assign just any meaning we
want to just any word, which is why she tries to correct the Cheshire Cat’s lexical choice (AIW
65). The Cheshire Cat, like a wayward philosopher, responds flippantly to Alice’s reliance on
31

Tenniel’s illustration of the Cheshire Cat’s grin is an appropriate example for Tennessee SPI 0801.7.2: “Select a
visual image that best reinforces a viewpoint or enhances a presentation.”
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semantic rules: “‘Call it what you like’” (AIW 65). Again, when Alice tries to correct the words
used by the Mock Turtle, the Mock Turtle tells Alice “‘I mean what I say’” (AIW 109), which
echoes the words Alice herself used when addressing the March Hare and the Mad Hatter and is
an example of a solipsistic approach, an approach described by George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson as “the Humpty-Dumpty notion that something means ‘just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less’” (185).

Concision and Clarity
Dodgson reveals that you can mean what you say, but that does not ensure that others
will understand the meaning you are trying to convey. Many teachers focus on concision as a
means of affecting clarity, but young or immature writers rarely explain themselves enough or in
a sufficient manner. Concision is not always the best way to convey a message; as Dodgson
points out, being concise is not always possible:
“I meant by ‘impenetrability’ that we’ve had enough of that
subject, and it would be just as well if you’d mention what you
mean to do next, as I suppose you don’t mean to stop here all the
rest of your life.”
“That’s a great deal to make one word mean,” Alice said in a
thoughtful tone. (TLG 230)
While Humpty Dumpty may have been thinking all of the above when he said the word
impenetrability, he did not convey all he was thinking with the utterance of this one word;
furthermore, he was not likely to relay all of his thoughts with any one word, unless he can
successfully manage a portmanteau32, where “‘there are two meanings packed up in one word’”
(TLG 231). All in all, we get the sense that Dodgson felt a better understanding of how semantics
32

“A word formed by blending sounds from two or more distinct words and combining their meanings” (OED). The
definition of portmanteau, as it is used in this sense, is credited to L. Carroll. “A word formed by blending sounds
from two or more distinct words and combining their meanings” (OED).

45

affects our ability to convey meaning to others would result in better communication, because he
has given us an explanation (or two) that support this key idea, an idea that is set in opposition to
solipsism and can be used to cover Tennessee SPI 0801.3.9: “select illustrations, explanations,
anecdotes, descriptions and/or facts to support key ideas.” Certainly, after reading the Humpty
Dumpty and Cheshire Cat excerpts, side-by-side, most students will grasp their import as
evidence that we must use the right words and the necessary amount of words in order to be
understood within a given situation.

The Power of Speech
We know that all utterance has meaning, and, furthermore, that utterances have power. In
fact, some utterances are more powerful than others, as the utterances of the Mouse clearly
demonstrate: “‘Our family always hated cats—nasty, low, vulgar things!’” (AIW 19). Words can
be used to oppress or stigmatize, and the Mouse’s speech is typical of someone who wishes to
exert the power of class over another person or class 33. Additionally, utterances can be used to
exert power over another individual: the Caterpillar uses speech to contradict and condescend to
Alice because he is using speech to assert authority. He makes Alice uncomfortable with his
“very short remarks” (AIW 42). The examples given here are indicative of Judith Butler’s
assertion that words of this sort do not merely “relay a message of [ . . . ] inferiority,” they speak
to “the verbal institution of [ . . . ] subordination” (351). In other words, the Mouse and the
Caterpillar are not just trying to say they are of superior class; they are using the powerful nature
of speech to ensure their superiority is considered part of the social institution. These examples
allow us to “identify and analyze [tone] that shapes meaning within context” (Tennessee SPI
33

The Mouse is a perfect candidate for Tennessee SPI 0801.8.6: “Identify and analyze how the author reveals
character.”
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0801.8.7) and to “evaluate text for fact or opinion” (Tennessee SPI 0801.5.2), as well as to
“identify instances of bias and stereotyping” (Tennessee SPI 0801.5.8).
Almost all of the creatures of Wonderland attempt to use speech as a tool to “subjugate”
or “suppress” Alice. Attempted verbal subjugation is evident when the March Hare and the Mad
Hatter see Alice for the first time: “‘No room! No room!’ they cried out when they saw Alice
coming” (AIW 68). Alice responds “indignantly,” which indicates that she is aware of the attempt
to verbally control her (AIW 68). Of course, the most powerful speech is the speech that silences
the utterances of others. After growing so large that she was stuck in the Rabbit’s house with her
arm hanging out the window, Alice grows tired of the rowdy creatures who are throwing pebbles
at her: “‘I’ll put a stop to this,’ she said to herself, and shouted out, ‘You’d better not do that
again!’ which produced another dead silence” (AIW 37). Interestingly, her reaction to the pebblethrowing creatures appears to be the first time Alice realizes the power of speech, but it is not.
We find Alice understands the power of speech when she is addressing herself: “‘I
wonder what Latitude or Longitude I’ve got to?’ (Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude
was, or Longitude either, but she thought they were nice grand words to say.)” (AIW 3). Alice
uses these “nice grand words” because she desires to sound intelligent, whether she believes she
is or not. Alice finds out, as most children eventually do, that sometimes people are not powerful,
but have only seemed so because of the power of the words they have employed: the soldiers
who come for Alice in the courtroom are shooed away because, whether they call themselves
soldiers or not, she finally realizes that they are “‘nothing but a pack of cards!’” (AIW 133)
Wonderland and the Looking-glass world are filled with creatures that use words to
construct a façade of power and/or intelligence, but none more so than the Walrus:
“The time has come,” the Walrus said,
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“To talk of many things:
Of shoes—and ships—and sealing wax—
Of cabbages—and kings—
And why the sea is boiling hot—
And whether pigs have wings.” (TLG 197)
The Walrus is representative of the humans who employ speech to make themselves appear
intelligent and, therefore, powerful. Of what use would it be to the Walrus or the Carpenter to
discuss these things, especially since two of them are “mute points”? There is no use to these
types of discussions other than to give the appearance of intelligence, which, among other
reasons, is a good indication that the Walrus and the Carpenter are excellent subjects to employ
while covering Tennessee SPI 0801.5.9: “make inferences and draw conclusions based on
evidence in the text.” Applying this particular SPI to the Walrus and the Carpenter seems
especially apropos since Alice herself tries to conclude which of the two she likes better based on
the poem about them (TLG 199); however, a consideration of these characters should occur
before the students read Alice’s response to the poem, so that the students will not be affected by
Alice’s consideration. Ultimately, we find that the Walrus and the Carpenter are able to establish
power over the oysters because they have used language that creates a mistaken belief that they
were powerful in the first place.

Polysemic Words
Dodgson’s commentary on language would not be complete without attention being
given to the multiple meanings that many English words carry. It is rather surprising that a
language with such a large lexicon would need to “make a word mean so much,” but some words
are associated with numerous different meanings. Much of Dodgson’s humor can be contributed
to the misunderstanding that arises when a polysemic word is utilized; for instance, the Mouse
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tries to dry the wet Alice by telling her a dry (boring) tale (AIW 22-23), and when Alice speaks
of beating time the Hatter replies, “‘He won’t stand beating’” (AIW 72).
Most of Dodgson’s commentaries on multiple meanings are presented as easily
understood puns; however, his most complicated attempt, a homonymic pun involving two
meaning-packed utterances, may be more difficult for the average English speaker to identify
and is actually a lovely example of Saussure’s syntagmatic and paradigmatic interdependence
theory. We find that when the Sheep first cries “Feather!” Alice takes it for an exclamation;
however, Alice asks why the Sheep keeps yelling the word feather and the Sheep tells her it is
because she is a “goose” (TLG 217). The real reason the Sheep keeps yelling the word feather is
because it is a synonym for row, and he wants Alice to row the boat they are in. And the term
goose, which may come to mind when one hears the word feather, is a double entendre used by
the Sheep to imply that Alice is a foolish person, apparently because she does not understand that
the Sheep is telling her to row the boat. Here, we have a funny illustration of a topic taken up by
Saussure between 1906 and 1911—how signification occurs. Alice is supposed to understand
that the Sheep is telling her to row the boat and, as a result of her not understanding the first
comment, that the sheep is using paradigmatic association to tell she is silly for not
understanding the initial command that resulted within a syntagmatic delivery. After all,
Saussure maintains that “all linguistic units depend either on what precedes or follows in the
spoken sequence, or else on the successive parts of which they are themselves composed” (126).
Dodgson has used two words related by one of their meanings to reveal that an entirely different
meaning can be signified when their homonyms are employed simultaneously.
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Homophones
Much like words with multiple meanings, homophones are often a source of confusion in
the English language, a fact that did not escape Dodgson. In fact, it is his humorous treatment of
homophones that led to the most famous representation of a shape poem: The Mouse’s Tail.
Because Alice hears tail when the Mouse says tale, she envisions an actual tail as the Mouse tells
his story:
“Mine is a long and a sad tale!” said the Mouse, turning to Alice,
and sighing. “It is a long tail, certainly,” said Alice, looking down
with wonder at the Mouse’s tail; “but why do you call it sad?”
(AIW 25)
Dodgson’s commentary on homophones leads us to humorously consider not and knot (AIW 27),
axis and axes (AIW 60), tea and T (AIW 119), flour and flower (TLG 275). Dodgson’s treatment
of English reveals the problems that arise with a language that adopts freely, with little thought
as to whether or not the new word may sound or look like existing lexical options; his treatment
also allows us to “recognize [possible] usage errors occurring in context” (Tennessee SPI
0801.1.14), to “analyze [a pun] within context” (Tennessee SPI 0801.8.8), and can be employed
to “choose the correct meaning/usage of a multi-meaning word by replacing the word in context
with an appropriate synonym or antonym” (Tennessee SPI 0801.1.17).

Historical Words
Many of the words that we claim as English are actually borrowed from another language
or created by compounding, processes which can be illustrated humorously with the words of
Dodgson. Nothing says compounding like compounding two words that have already been
compounded: Rocking Horsefly and Snapdragonfly (TLG 182-183). And Dodgson draws
attention to the foreign words we employ everyday as English: “Said the Dodo solemnly, [ . . . ]
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‘I move that the meeting adjourn, for the immediate adoption of more energetic remedies.’
‘Speak English!’ said the Eaglet” (AIW 23). The Eaglet is actually justified in telling the Dodo to
speak English, because the words the Dodo has chosen are borrowed from other languages and
were not initially English (or Anglo-Saxon words): energetic is Greek; adjourn is Old French;
and remedies and adoption are French. Of course, this remark about the un-English parts of our
language is hardly surprising after the Mouse has told a story concerning the Norman invasion, a
story that was preceded by mention of the same French-speaking peoples: “’I dare say it’s a
French mouse, come over with William the Conqueror34’” (AIW 18). Dodgson’s comments on
the history of our language are interesting to consider and can certainly be utilized while
covering Tennessee SPI 0801.8.13: “determine the influence of culture or ethnicity on the
themes and issues of literary texts.” An exploration of cultural influence is appropriately applied
to these illustrations as they speak to the different cultures that have influenced our language.
The effects of the Norman invasion on our language most certainly can be considered as
part of the message intended when the Anglo-Saxon messenger arrives on the scene: “‘He’s an
Anglo-Saxon Messenger—and those are Anglo-Saxon attitudes’” (TLG 239). What are AngloSaxon attitudes? The answer may be partly discerned from the poem “Jabberwocky,” which
Dodgson originally intended to be an Anglo-Saxon poem. The Jabberwocky poem is written in a
language Alice does not understand; still, she is able to determine that “‘somebody killed
something’” (TLG 160), because the language of the poem follows the rules of the English

34

While Tennessee 8th grade students do not necessarily cover the Norman Conquest, Tennessee 9th grade students
do learn about the rivalry between the French and English through their coverage of European monarchs (in World
History); therefore, a preliminary discussion of the events of 1066 can prove helpful.
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language or the Old English language 35, as it were. While middle grades and secondary students
do not generally take up the topic of Old English (or West Saxon), college students do, which
makes these examples appropriate in classes such as History of the English Language, where
they can be used to scaffold new knowledge onto existing schemas.

Words at Work
Dodgson leaves almost no linguistic stone unturned in his Alice books. We find examples
of different words with the same meaning, as both “jurors” and “jurymen” are used to describe
the members of the jury at the trial (AIW 115), and words that sound similar, such as lessen and
lesson (AIW 103) and purpose and porpoise (AIW 109). Even different phrases that mean the
same thing get the Dodgson treatment: “To Tweedledum’s House” and “To the House of
Tweedledee” (TLG 189). Of course, all of these are examples of how difficult language can be;
sometimes it is hard to find the right word to express how we feel or what we mean. However,
sometimes there is only one right word for what we mean, which the Mad Hatter should have
known when he was asking Alice to verify the information he had gotten from his watch. When
he asks Alice “what day of the month” it is (AIW 71) he reveals the absurdity of such a question.
Not just any word can be inserted into just any phrase.
Why did Dodgson take up the theme of language? Because he saw, or rather heard, what
we have all heard: the confusing words of others. When Jeremy Bentham employed the word

35

It is not surprising that Time is a “him” given that Anglo-Saxon time was masculine: “‘If you knew Time as well
as I do,’ said the Hatter, ‘you wouldn’t talk about wasting it. It’s him’” (AIW 72). The word “tima” (time—hour)
was a weak masculine noun in Old English.
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antipathist36 he assuredly confused many people who had no ready referent archived for the
word, most certainly because he employs it in a contrary fashion; after all, we understand that
sympathy and empathy are applied when we share or have concern for the feelings of others, so
we would assume that antipathy means to be against feeling. Bentham, however, employs
antipathist to signify “a natural enemy,” which Dodgson comments upon by playing with the
word: “‘How funny it’ll seem to come out among the people that walk with their heads
downward! The Antipathies, I think’” (AIW 4). Really, who of us has not, at one time or another,
been confused by something we have heard or read? Children certainly experience this referent
confusion all the time, as is illustrated in AIW with the use of the word suppressed:
Here one of the guinea pigs cheered, and was immediately
suppressed by the officers of the court. [ . . . . ] “I’m glad I have
seen that done,” thought Alice. “I’ve so often read in the
newspapers, at the end of trials, ‘There was some attempt at
applause, which was immediately suppressed by the officers of the
court,’ and I never understood what it meant until now.” (AIW 120121)
What had occurred in Alice’s mind the first time she heard the word suppressed? Recently, a ten
year-old child, who had never heard the word before, revealed that meaning is easily assumed
based on prior knowledge: “Depressed means sad, so suppressed means happy?” Given our tenyear old subject’s response, both of these examples may be properly chunked for Tennessee SPI
0801.6.1: “formulat[ion] of questions before, during, and after reading,” as these sections will
most likely lead to questions about the terms on which Dodgson is commenting. Furthermore, in
AIW, we find that the gryphon felt that Alice should understand the meaning of uglification since
36

According to the OED, an antipathist is “One possessed by [natural contrariety or incompatibility] or
constitutional aversion; a natural enemy.” The first citation is contributed to Jeremy Bentham, a utilitarian
philosopher.
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she knew the meaning of beautification (AIW 101-102), basing his assumption on her presumed
ability to understand antonyms. While depression and suppression are not antonyms, neither are
beautification and uglification, but both assumptions are formed due to a general premise that
most words have antonyms. Of course, Alice’s mistake is more humorous than that of our ten
year-old subject because there is no such word as uglification (or, at least, there wasn’t before
Dodgson created it). All of the aforementioned examples can be utilized during an exploration of
Tennessee SPI 0801.1.16: “use context clues and/or knowledge of root words and affixes to
determine the meaning of unfamiliar words.” In fact, the way Dodgson introduces and plays with
these examples of words built from Latin roots makes their consideration the perfect introduction
to a serious discussion of why Latin root words are important to our understanding of English.
The words we choose to employ have fallen under great scrutiny within the field of
rhetoric. How we assign meaning is of great concern to rhetoricians and philosophers alike. And
some of the most troublesome words are the ones that describe abstract thoughts: “‘Did you ever
see such a thing as a drawing of a muchness?’” (AIW 77). We may believe that Alice would
think it was difficult to draw muchness because muchness is not a word, but the real reason Alice
would think it difficult to draw muchness is because it represents those abstract words for which
we have no concrete referent.

Ambiguity and Vagueness
The lack of a concrete referent is an issue that creates ambiguity—“when a word can be
taken in two or more senses” (Rhetorica Ad Herennium 280). Ambiguity most usually results
from the use of a pronoun without a specified antecedent. Dodgson provides a much
underappreciated example of the aggravation caused by ambiguity in the poem read at the court
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hearing, which, in its capacity as evidence, reveals the importance of specified antecedents (AIW
129). Pronouns that lack antecedents and undeclared subjects lead to the most exasperating
confusions for Alice. When the Pigeon goes on a tirade about “them,” Alice has no idea to whom
the Pigeon is referring (AIW 50). And when the Caterpillar tells Alice “‘One side will make you
grow taller, and the other side will make you grow shorter’” (AIW 49) Alice has to exert all of
her mental energy to figure out to what the Caterpillar is referring. These examples can
obviously be used to “stress the correct pronoun-antecedent agreement for personal pronouns
within context” (Tennesee SPI 0801.1.11), as well as to “identify the [author’s] purpose for
writing” (Tennessee SPI 0801.3.1), especially the poem used as evidence, which does not have a
title and, therefore, is the perfect choice for Tennessee SPI 0801.3.10: “select [or create] an
appropriate title that reflects the topic of a written selection.” These examples can also be used in
consideration of when we should avoid ambiguity and when we should employ it; in Rhetorica
Ad Herennium the author maintains that “we must avoid those ambiguities which render the style
obscure” and “seek those which produce an emphasis” (280). Dodgson has clearly employed
ambiguity to emphasize the pitfalls of ambiguity, as he does with vagueness.
Akin to ambiguity, and just as confusing, is vagueness. Bertrand Russell finds vagueness
to be “a matter of degree, depending upon the extent of the possible differences between
different systems represented by the same representation” (“Vagueness”)
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. In other words,

sometimes our speech is not detailed enough to make sense. Dodgson draws attention to
vagueness37 when he creates homonymic puns, but he pens a more obvious example when Alice
requests assistance from the Cheshire Cat:

37

It is interesting to note that Russell claimed to have created a language that prevents vagueness (“Vagueness”),
while Dodgson created a language that initially allowed for a greater emphasis of vagueness.
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“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk from
here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the
Cat.
“I don’t much care where,” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you walk,” said the Cat.
“—so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation.
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk long
enough!” (AIW 64)
Alice’s speech was not sufficient enough to garner the response she desired, just as the
Dormouse’s story is insufficient, which causes Alice to ask for more details (AIW 75). Of course,
the Dormouse’s impromptu details reveal that he is not a good story teller (like many of the
children’s authors that came before Dodgson) and is just saying anything that pops into his head,
which reveals a possible reason for vagueness of speech: ineptitude.

Pragmatic Social Skills
Ineptitude is at the essence of most communication problems. Although no one wants to
admit the reason for miscommunication or lack of communication may be his or her own
ineptitude, both Mikhail Bakhtin and I.A. Richards imply that our inability to understand words
or utterances in context is the root of ineptitude. Bakhtin’s theory squarely places communication
problems in the arena of ineptitude when he claims that people who “feel quite helpless in certain
spheres of communication [ . . . ] do not have a practical command of generic forms used in a
given sphere” (1239). Richards and Ogden indicate that miscommunication may arise from our
assumptions that others communicate as we do:
Normally, whenever we hear anything said we spring
spontaneously to an immediate conclusion, namely, that the
speaker is referring to what we should be referring to were we
speaking the words ourselves. (1276)
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While people of all ages make these communication faux pas, the essence of the matter may be
clearly illustrated with the experiences of children, as Dodgson does.
Ineptitude is the essence of childhood; therefore, it should not be surprising that
Dodgson’s tale, which is written for children, illustrates the specific difficulties that children
experience with language. In general, the issues faced in childhood are illustrated by the fact that
Alice often says the wrong thing and offends the creatures because she has not learned the
pragmatic social skills needed for social interaction—a very common lesson for children to have
to learn. We find examples of the type of speech or utterances for which children are often
reprimanded: “‘Don’t grunt,’ said Alice; ‘that’s not at all a proper way of expressing yourself’”
(AIW 62), which is the equivalent of “use your words.” A language lesson that all children
should learn is that socially unacceptable speech may lead to being ostracized: “‘If you are going
to turn into a pig, my dear,’ said Alice seriously, ‘I’ll have nothing more to do with you’” (AIW
62). There are, after all, social rules that govern our speech, such as how we are to introduce two
unacquainted parties: “‘Alice—Mutton; Mutton—Alice’” (TLG 283). Certain utterances and
responses are deemed appropriate and are required by our society, a reminder of which we find
in the Rabbit’s questioning of Alice’s reaction to the Duchess’s sentence of execution: “‘What
for?’ said Alice. ‘Did you say, ‘What a pity!’?’ the Rabbit asked” (AIW 85). Even though Alice
did not feel pity, if she expressed anything at all, she was expected to express pity, which is what
Bakhtin was recognizing when he asserted that there are “forms of utterances that are [socially]
mandatory” (1240). These are certainly examples that can be used to cover Tennessee SPI
0801.5.9 again (infer and conclude), as Dodgson never says that the children should use their
words (and in a prescribed manner) or they are no better than animals, but he does turn the baby
into a pig because it does not use human speech. The baby/pig episode allows for the “prediction
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of future events” (Tennessee SPI 0801.5.1), as long as the prediction is encouraged after the
baby’s first grunt (AIW 62), and for the “analyz[ation] of cause-effect relationships” (Tennessee
SPI 0801.5.3), as the baby turns into a pig because it does not “use its words.”
As Dodgson points out, there are pragmatic social skills that children must learn in order
to be deemed socially acceptable, and these skills most often revolve around our utterances,
which is why socially unacceptable speech or actions are pointed out, whether they are comical
or not: “As they all spoke at one, she found it very hard to make out exactly what they said”
(AIW 90). Alice is certain “‘Manners are not taught in lessons’” (TLG 273), because manners, or
socially acceptable behaviors and speech, are learned from observing them in action—and from
reading them in entertaining children’s tales, apparently. Alice finds on several occasions that the
“do not speak unless you are spoken to” rule is problematic, for she is sure never to know which
end of this rule she is to be on:
“Speak when you’re spoken to!” the Queen sharply interrupted her.
“But if everybody obeyed that rule,” said Alice, who was always
ready for a little argument, “and if you only spoke when you were
spoken to, and the other person always waited for you to begin,
you see, nobody would ever say anything.” (TLG 271)
Alice’s reaction to this rule allows for the consideration of Tennessee SPI 0801.5.6: “identify an
example of deductive or inductive reasoning in the text,” as Alice has realized the futility of this
language rule through deductive reasoning. Through Alice’s interactions with the Queen and the
Rose, who is frustrated because she was waiting for Alice to speak first (TLG 165), Dodgson
acknowledges that there are rules that govern not only what we should say, but also when we
should say anything at all—and if these rules are not logical they should be altered.
Alice certainly experiences the reality of language rules when speaking to the Mouse.
Through her interactions with the Mouse, Alice reveals that she understands there are rules for
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language use: “‘O Mouse!’ (Alice thought this must be the right way of speaking to a mouse: [ . .
. ] she remembered having seen in her brother’s Latin Grammar’)” (AIW 18). However, it is not
her address that proves troublesome; rather, it is the topic she chooses to broach. While speaking
of her cat is acceptable and even expected for most speech situations in which Alice would find
herself, it is not acceptable when speaking to a mouse. Through her conversations with the
Mouse, Alice learns what all children learn sooner or later: speech that is acceptable in one
context is unacceptable in another, and unacceptable speech is ineffective speech.

Paralanguage
The effectiveness of speech is a topic broached several times by Dodgson in the Alice
books, where lack of conversation, speechlessness, and even body language are explored. The
silence between the Caterpillar and Alice (AIW 41) results from Alice’s hope to avoid the
condescension of the Caterpillar, who is, seemingly, waiting for Alice to speak so that he may
have a chance to “lord it over” her. The actions of the Pigeon leave Alice speechless because she
is not equipped with the speech necessary to respond to an unwarranted attack (AIW 51). In other
instances, Alice mistakenly takes a lengthy pause in speech as a cue that the speaker has said all
he wishes to say (AIW 100). Besides problems caused by lack of speech, problems caused by
inappropriate body language cause Alice to wonder if the utterances of another character are
being directed at her. Because Humpty Dumpty does not look at Alice when he is talking to her,
Alice thinks he is not talking to her (TLG 223). Alice thinks it “decidedly uncivil” that the Frog
Footman “was looking up at the sky all the time he was speaking” (AIW 56). We find this
inappropriate body language causes Alice to assume the creatures are rude or ignorant, which is
exemplified when Alice responds to the Frog Footman’s behavior with disdain: “‘he’s perfectly
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idiotic!’” (AIW 57). These examples of ineffective speech caused by body language issues can be
used while covering Tennessee SPI 0801.2.4: “determine the most effective methods of engaging
an audience during an oral presentation,” which should include issues such as body language and
eye contact.

Futile Words
Dodgson not only addresses ineffective speech, he also addresses words that are socially
assigned more weight or meaning than should be allowable. A favorite of Victorians was the
word best; if something was declared the best, then it was all the rage, as it most certainly would
be by English speakers today. Since best is a relative term that should be used in a comparison of
identified objects (or subjects), it is not surprising that Dodgson took exception to the
inappropriate use of the word, which had become quite common. In Wonderland, the March
Hare doesn’t understand why dipping the watch in butter could have ruined the watch because
“‘It was the best butter’” (AIW 71). Just because someone had determined the butter that he had
used was the best butter does not mean that it would be the best choice made in every decision
faced. This particular example can be used to cover Tennessee SPI 0801.1.15: “select the
appropriate use of underlining/italicizing,” as emphasis has been placed on the word best for a
particular reason. We are meant to recognize the futility of using the “best” of something if it is
not the correct thing; therefore, this example may also be used to “identify a false premise in
text” (Tennessee SPI 0801.5.7). Furthermore, the word best has been taken up by philosophers
and rhetoricians alike; in fact, George Campbell and Richard Whatley have a tryst with best right
before the Alices were written and I.A. Richards, who openly admits he has been to the
Carrollian school of thought, does the same after the Alices were written.
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The Lessening
Dodgson has provided quite the all-encompassing lesson on language, a topic most
children claim to abhor. Yet, children world-wide enjoy the Alice books. And this enjoyment is
just one of the reasons Dodgson offers a better way to talk to students about grammar and
language. Dodgson focuses on language as it is used, rather than words in isolation, and when we
teach students about the art of language, we should focus on the type of verbal interaction we
find in the Alices. Several possible lesson topics have been discussed in this chapter, and several
more have been included in appendices of this study, where an individual lesson and a sample
curriculum-based text have been included.
The genius behind the lessons Dodgson provides is that they are delivered in a way that
makes them applicable to any time period because they are devoid of horological and cultural
concerns. Furthermore, they are delivered in a way that is humorous and entertaining—in a way
that hardly seems a lesson at all. And even if a lesson is discerned, it does not lessen our
enjoyment because it is a lesson applicable to anyone who needs to communicate, which is
everyone. It is also a lesson that lies at the heart of rhetorical theory, which should not be
surprising given Quintilian’s assertion that we should be teaching language arts and rhetoric at
the same time, as is evidenced in the approach to this discussion of Carrollian Language Arts.
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CHAPTER V
THE DODGSON LEGACY: REELING AND WRITHING
WITH LANGUAGE

When you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you
would praise a man for having done.
—Aristotle, On Rhetoric
Some have claimed that Dodgson did not intend to teach anything with his Alice books;
for instance, Jan Susina quotes one of Dodgson’s letters to a child to prove that Dodgson’s
fictional stories “do not teach anything at all” (111); however, Dodgson’s letters to children were
often full of humorous contradiction, as is evidenced by a lengthy letter written to Bertie Coote
that states he cannot write to Bertie because he has no ink (The Letters 276). Dodgson wrote
another such letter, claiming there were no morals in his Alice books, and he has even made fun
of the morals presented by other authors:
“And the moral of that is—‘Be what you would seem to be’; or, if
you’d like it put more simply—‘Never imagine yourself not to be
otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were
or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been
would have appeared to them to be otherwise.” (AIW 95)
However, we find that Dodgson’s tales are covertly didactic. Children rarely appreciate being
preached at and if we can deliver stories that make them think about not drinking just anything
because it may be poison (AIW 7) then we can deliver a story with a moral (or ten) that is
understood, even if it is not presented as a mind-numbing sermon. Dodgson, the language
learner, understood what Mikhail Bakhtin understood, our basic understanding of language and

the rules that govern how we communicate are learned through observation of language in
action. However, Dodgson, the teacher, also understood that we learn from texts and from
instruction as well, especially if texts and instructions can offer us an observational view of
matters. Dodgson understood that “’Everything’s got a moral, if only you can find it’” (AIW 94).
Children’s tales, much like any other tale really, always include something educational,
something didactic, something that constitutes a moral. But Dodgson has given the world the two
best commentaries on language, without making them appear like moralistic sermons: “And the
moral of that is—” language is universal and language has rules, but learning about it is only fun
if you don’t claim the lesson includes a moral.
Dodgson offers us what arguably amounts to the two best texts for the teaching of
language arts to children—books that have also been used quite often to explicate linguistic and
rhetorical theory. While Dodgson has provided much fodder for philosophers and theorists, he
has been largely overlooked as a theorist in his own right; the reason for which may lie with the
fact that his work was written for children and has been declared nonsense. However, a closer
look at the linguistic and rhetorical issues portrayed in the Alice books reveals that the only
nonsense occurring is that which occurs every day when our utterances do not follow logical
linguistic and contextual rules. Dodgson should be recognized as a theorist because he has not
only been accepted as a language specialist in judicial circles, verifiably expanded our lexicon,
and, according to Michael Hoey, altered our syntagmatic word associations, but also given us
proof that he has traced the logical consequences of many of the linguistic and rhetorical theories
that both preceded and proceeded his time—theories of which he understood well enough to
create easily understood concrete illustrations.
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The paradigmatic and syntagmic word associations of which Saussure speaks are found
in Alice’s wor(l)ds; so are the mandatory utterances, as well as the speech genres, of which
Bakhtin speaks; so are the verbal confusions of which I.A. Richard’s speaks; so are the
metaphors of which George Lakoff speaks; so are the contrarily used words of which Quintilian
speaks; so are the verbal paradoxes of which Gilles DeLeuze speaks. Through his children’s
literature Dodgson gives us examples of almost every communication and language issue that we
may face, and he does so in a dioramic way that allows us to forego most external factors, but
also in a way that sheds light on the different types of communication macrocosms we face on a
daily basis. After all, Alice deals with the alien peer, those with more power, those with less
power, those who wish to appear that have power but do not. Alice even gives us a glimpse at the
types of pre-verbal activities we engage in, as well as the verbal interactions we have with
ourselves. Alice even takes on the more philosophical concerns of language, such as if a word
needs to mean something, if we can change the meanings of words, if we can lose our names, if
we can force an action to occur because we have spoke into being, if we can create an entire
social order by speaking it into being, if the abstract can be signified. Alice and her alien peers
use polysemic words and homophones and puns and similes and metaphors and Latin root words
and deductive reasoning; they show us character analysis and cause-effect relationships and false
premises. And they make us consider pronoun-antecedent issues and conflict that arises from
verbal confusion and how tone affects our message. And the list goes on.
Because Dodgson thoroughly explores many of the different speech genres and language
concerns we face and consider, Dodgson gives us concrete examples of language in action—an
it-is construction—which allows him to reveal how verbal confusion and chaos occurs, how
conflict arises when good language rules are not followed, when bad language rules are
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followed, or when we do not know which rules to follow because we find ourselves in alien
situations. And all of these examples are perfect material for language arts and rhetorical theory
instruction because they are not only delivered without the shroud of a specific culture, era, or
time frame, but they are delivered in an enjoyable and entertaining manner. Dodgson has created
literature that has endured and has permeated cultures around the world because he has provided
an enjoyable lesson from which we all benefit: our speech must be effective if we are to be
successful and our speech must be contextually appropriate in order to be effective. But Dodgson
has also given us proof that social and linguistic rules will always restrict our speech, most
certainly if we expect to actually say what we mean or mean what we say. He has shown us that
we need to closely consider our communicative systems, as the nonsense and play found in the
worlds of Alice has resulted from the illogical nature of the systems we employ everyday—the
ones with rules that do not necessarily make sense, but still must be learned.
Too often we try to teach philosophy with philosophy and theory with theory and
language with dry, unrelatable examples (such as those provided by the Dormouse and many
philosophers), which by no means clarifies the matter for the masses. We certainly see evidence
that the dry, unrelatable approach is ineffectual for the majority of people who actually use
language when we consider Kenneth Burke’s attempt to explain the problem of vagueness with
an explanation from John Locke. Fortunately, we find that philosophers and theorists can employ
simpler illustrations to explicate their ideas; they most certainly have utilized Dodgson’s work in
this fashion. Additionally, we find that middle grades teachers would be at a loss to find other
texts that cover as many language arts issues as AIW and TLG do, and, if they could, the texts are
more likely to be textbooks that do not offer these issues in context, which is not only desirable
but a requirement of many of the SPIs that must currently be observed.
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Dodgson’s fictive representations of our ordinary language concerns serve as concrete
examples of contextual verbal interactions; therefore, they serve as appropriate material for the
teaching of rhetoric and language arts. Dodgson’s ability to create language and illustrations of
everyday language issues can be traced back to his personal quest for order and meaning. The
logician and teacher has uncovered the accepted language and language practices that can result
in verbal confusion and ineffective speech, as well as the accepted practices that can help us to
avoid verbal confusion and social conflict—all of which reveals a theorist in his own right, one
who aides our understanding of signification and pragmatic social skills.
Dodgson has given us lessons and illustrations in language creation, language arts, and
rhetorical theory. Given that we can discern Dodgson’s useful and humorous take language and
given that the books are still ideological viable and culturally popular, it appears that we should
take a cue from the theorists themselves and teach philosophy and theory and language with a
porpoise; it’s the key to the garden—the garden where we find a long-awaited designation of
Dodgson as a theorist.
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APPENDIX A
THE EVIDENCE LESSON

The Evidence Lesson
Name: ___________________________________ Date: ____________________
During the trial, the proceeding was submitted as evidence by the White Rabbit. After reading
the words answer the questions that follow.
They told me you had been to her,
And mentioned me to him:
She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim.

My notion was that you had been
(Before she had this fit)
An obstacle that came between
Him and ourselves and it.

He sent them word I had not gone
(We know it to be true):
If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?

Don’t let them know she liked them best,
For this must ever be
A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me.

If I or she should chance to be
Involved in this affair,
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.
1. Can you identify this group of words as an example of a literary genre? If so, which one?
2. The Queen claims this evidence proves the Knave’s guilt; Alice says this evidence proves
nothing. Which one is correct and why?
3. List the reflexive pronouns found within the “evidence”:
4. Are the reflexive pronouns used properly? Explain your answer:
5. What was Carroll’s purpose for creating this “evidence”?
6. Carroll did not give a title for the “evidence.” Create a title that you feel will work for this
piece:
7. Underline two correctly presented introductory clauses.
8. Circle the correct use of a comma with a coordinating conjunction.
9. Highlight an incorrect use of commas with coordinating conjunctions.
______________________________________________________________________
SPI 0801.1.1 Identify the correct use of nouns (i.e., common/proper, singular/plural, possessives,
direct/indirect objects, predicate nouns) and pronouns (i.e., reflexive, interrogative,
demonstrative) within context.
SPI 0801.1.7 Identify within context a variety of appropriate sentence-combining techniques
(i.e., comma with coordinating conjunction, use of semicolon, introductory phrases or clauses).
SPI 0801.1.11 Illustrate the need for pronoun-antecedent agreement.
SPI 0801.3.10 Select an appropriate title that reflects the topic of a written selection.
SPI 0801.8.4 Distinguish among different genres (e.g., poetry, drama, biography, novel) using
their distinguishing characteristics.
SPI 0801.8.14 Identify the author’s purpose for writing.

APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF A CURRICULUM-BASED TEXT
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Chapter I

Down the Rabbit Hole
Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister
on the bank and of having nothing to do; once or twice she
had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had
no pictures or conversations in it, "and what is the use of a
book," thought Alice, "without pictures or conversations?”
So she was considering, in her own mind (as well as she
could, for the hot day made her feel very sleepy and stupid)
whether the pleasure of making a daisy chain would be
worth the trouble of getting up and picking the daisies, when
suddenly a White Rabbit with pink eyes ran close by her.

Think-Aloud
Rubric
Before class
reading of chaper
I, instruct students
to tally the number
of times each
strategy is used
during the first
class reading.

SPI 0801.6.3
Stupid:
to be stunned or
benumbed.

---- What happened to Alice? Why does she see the rabbit? ---There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice
think it so much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to
itself, "Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!" (when she
thought it over afterwards it occurred to her that she ought
to have wondered at this, but at the time it all seemed quite
natural); but, when the Rabbit actually took a watch out of
its waistcoat pocket, and looked at it, and then hurried on,
Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that
she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoatpocket, or a watch to take out of it, and, burning with
curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and was just in
time to see it pop down a large rabbit hole under the hedge.
In another moment down went Alice after it, never once
considering how in the world she was to get out again.
---- Does Alice’s reaction remind you of something you have seen,
heard, or read? ---The rabbit hole went straight on like a tunnel for some way,
and then dipped suddenly down, so suddenly that Alice had
not a moment to think about stopping herself before she
found herself falling down what seemed to be a very deep
well.

SPI 0801.5.9
Make inferences.

SPI 0801.1.15
Why are certain
words in this
paragraph
italicized?

Either the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly, for she
had plenty of time as she went down to look about her, and
to wonder what was going to happen next. First she tried to
look down and make out what she was coming to, but it was
too dark to see anything; then she looked at the sides of the
well, and noticed that they were filled with cupboards and
book-shelves; here and there she saw maps and pictures
hung upon pegs. She took down a jar from one of the shelves
as she passed; it was labeled "ORANGE MARMALADE," but
to her great disappointment it was empty; she did not like to
drop the jar for fear of killing somebody underneath, so
managed to put it into one of the cupboards as she fell past
it.

SPI 0801.6.3
Marmalade

---- Think about what you saw in your mind while you read about
Alice’s fall. ---"Well!" thought Alice to herself, "after such a fall as this, I
shall think nothing of tumbling downstairs! How brave they'll
all think me at home! Why, I wouldn't say anything about it
even if I fell off the top of the house!" (Which was very likely
true.)
Down, down, down. Would the fall never come to an end? "I
wonder how many miles I've fallen by this time?" she said
aloud. "I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the
earth. Let me see: that would be four thousand miles down, I
think" (for, you see, Alice had learned several things of this
sort in her lessons in the schoolroom, and though this was
not a very good opportunity for showing off her knowledge,
as there was no one to listen to her, still it was good practice
to say it over)—“yes, that's about the right distance—but
then I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I've got to?" (Alice
had not the slightest idea what Latitude was, or Longitude
either, but she thought they were nice grand words to say.)
---- What is the lesson hidden inside this passage? ---Presently she began again. "I wonder if I shall fall right
through the earth! How funny it'll seem to come out among
the people that walk with their heads downward! The
78

Have students
begin a Reading
Journal. They will
use the Journal to
respond to their
reading (some
prompts have been
provided), as well
as to record the
assignments
completed from the
prompts that
address standards.

SPI 0801.1.1
Re-read page 4
and make a list of
all proper nouns
that you find.

Antipathies, I think" (she was rather glad there was no one
listening this time, as it didn't sound at all the right word);
"but I shall have to ask them what the name of the country
is, you know. Please, ma'am, is this New Zealand or
Australia?" (and she tried to curtsy as she spoke—fancy
curtsying as you're falling through the air! Do you think you
could manage it?) "And what an ignorant little girl she'll
think me for asking! No, it'll never do to ask; perhaps I shall
see it written up somewhere."

SPI 0801.6.3
Antipathist:
a natural enemy

Would we say “I
shall see it written
up somewhere”?

-- Do you think Einstein would feel ignorant for asking a question? -Down, down, down. There was nothing else to do, so Alice
soon began talking again. "Dinah'll miss me very much
tonight, I should think!" (Dinah was the cat.) "I hope they'll
remember her saucer of milk at teatime. Dinah, my dear! I
wish you were down here with me! There are no mice in the
air, I'm afraid, but you might catch a bat, and that's very like
a mouse, you know. But do cats eat bats, I wonder?" And
here Alice began to get rather sleepy, and went on saying to
herself, in a dreamy sort of way, "Do cats eat bats? Do cats
eat bats?" and sometimes, "Do bats eat cats?" for, you see,
as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't much matter
which way she put it. She felt that she was dozing off, and
had just begun to dream that she was walking hand in hand
with Dinah, and was saying to her very earnestly, "Now,
Dinah, tell me the truth, did you ever eat a bat?" when
suddenly, thump! thump! down she came upon a heap of
sticks and dry leaves, and the fall was over.
---- How could Alice feel like she was falling asleep if she was
already dreaming? ---Alice was not a bit hurt, and she jumped up on to her feet in
a moment; she looked up, but it was all dark overhead;
before her was another long passage, and the White Rabbit
was still in sight, hurrying down it. There was not a moment
to be lost: away went Alice like the wind, and was just in
time to hear it say, as it turned a corner, "Oh my ears and
whiskers, how late it's getting!" She was close behind it when
she turned the corner, but the Rabbit was no longer to be
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If we move words
around within the
sentence does the
meaning stay the
same?

SPI 0801.5.9
Draw conclusions.

SPI 0801.8.8
Can you find the
simile in this
paragraph?

“Oh” is an
exclamation.

seen: she found herself in a long, low hall, which was lit up
by a row of lamps hanging from the roof.
There were doors all round the hall, but they were all locked,
and when Alice had been all the way down one side and up
the other, trying every door, she walked sadly down the
middle, wondering how she was ever to get out again.
Suddenly she came upon a little three-legged table, all made
of solid glass; there was nothing on it but a tiny golden key,
and Alice's first idea was that this might belong to one of the
doors of the hall; but, alas! either the locks were too large, or
the key was too small, but at any rate it would not open any
of them. However, on the second time round she came upon
a low curtain she had not noticed before, and behind it was
a little door about fifteen inches high; she tried the little
golden key in the lock, and to her great delight it fitted!
Alice opened the door and
found that it led into a
small passage, not much
larger than a rat hole; she
knelt down and looked
along the passage into the
loveliest garden you ever
saw. How she longed to get
out of that dark hall, and
wander about among those
beds of bright flowers and
those cool fountains. But
she could not even get her head through the doorway. "And
even if my head would go through," thought poor Alice, "it
would be of very little use without my shoulders. Oh, how I
wish I could shut up like a telescope! I think I could, if I only
knew how to begin." For, you see, so many out-of-the-way
things had happened lately that Alice had begun to think
that very few things indeed were really impossible.
---- Why did Alice feel hopeful about getting into the garden even
though she was too big to fit through the door? ---80
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There seemed to be no use in waiting by the little door, so
she went back to the table, half hoping she might find
another key on it, or at any rate a book of rules for shutting
people up like telescopes: this time she found a little bottle
on it, ("which certainly was not here before," said Alice), and
tied round the neck of the bottle was a paper label with the
words "DRINK ME" beautifully printed on it in large letters.
It was all very well to say "Drink me," but the wise little Alice
was not going to do that in a hurry. "No, I'll look first," she
said, "and see whether it's marked 'poison' or not," for she
had read several nice little stories about children who had
got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts, and other
unpleasant things, all because they would not remember the
simple rules their friends had taught them, such as, that a
red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and that if
you cut your finger very deeply with a knife it usually bleeds;
and she had never forgotten that if you drink much from a
bottle marked "poison," it is almost certain to disagree with
you, sooner or later.

Where does Alice
think she will find
instructions on
“shutting up like a
telescope”?

This paragraph is
didactic. Look up
the definition for
“didactic” and write
it down.

---- What is the lesson hidden within this passage? ---However, this bottle was not marked "poison," so Alice
ventured to taste it, and finding it very nice (it had, in fact, a
sort of mixed flavour of cherry tart, custard, pineapple, roast
turkey, toffy, and hot buttered toast), she very soon finished
it off.
"What a curious feeling!" said Alice. "I must be shutting up
like a telescope."
And so it was indeed; she was now only ten inches high, and
her face brightened up at the thought that she was now the
right size for going through the little door into that lovely
garden. First, however, she waited for a few minutes to see if
she was going to shrink any further: she felt a little nervous
about this, "for it might end, you know," said Alice to herself,
"in my going out altogether, like a candle. I wonder what I
should be like then?" And she tried to fancy what the flame
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of a candle looks like after the candle is blown out, for she
could not remember ever having seen such a thing.
---- Can you recall feeling nervous about change? ---After a while, finding that nothing more happened, she
decided on going into the garden at once; but, alas for poor
Alice! when she got to the door, she found she had forgotten
the little golden key, and when she went back to the table for
it, she found she could not possibly reach it. She could see it
quite plainly through the glass, and she tried her best to
climb up one of the legs of the table, but it was too slippery,
and when she had tired herself out with trying, the poor little
thing sat down and cried.
---- How would you describe how Alice is feeling? ---"Come, there's no use in crying like that!" said Alice to
herself rather sharply; "I advise you to leave off this minute!"
She generally gave herself very good advice (though she very
seldom followed it), and sometimes she scolded herself so
severely as to bring tears into her eyes, and once she
remembered trying to box her own ears for having cheated
herself in a game of croquet she was playing against herself;
for this curious child was very fond of pretending to be two
people. "But it's no use now," thought poor Alice, "to pretend
to be two people! Why, there's hardly enough of me left to
make one respectable person!"
---- Do you ever talk to yourself? ---Soon her eye fell on a little glass box that was lying under
the table: she opened it, and found in it a very small cake, on
which the words "EAT ME" were beautifully marked in
currants. "Well, I'll eat it," said Alice, "and if it makes me
grow larger, I can reach the key; and if it makes me grow
smaller, I can creep under the door; so either way I'll get into
the garden, and I don't care which happens!"
---- What do you think is going to happen? ---82
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She ate a little bit, and said anxiously to herself, "Which
way? Which way?" holding her hand on the top of her head
to feel which way it was growing, and she was quite
surprised to find that she remained the same size; to be
sure, this is what generally happens when one eats cake, but
Alice had got so much into the way of expecting nothing but
out-of-the-way things to happen that it seemed quite dull
and stupid for life to go on in the common way.
So she set to work, and very soon finished off the cake.

Chapter II

The Pool of Tears
“Curiouser and curiouser!” cried Alice (she was so much
surprised, that for the moment she quite forgot how to speak
good English); “now I'm opening out like the largest telescope
that ever was! Good-bye, feet!” (For when she looked down at
her feet, they seemed to be almost out of sight, they were
getting so far off.) “Oh, my poor little feet, I wonder who will
put on your shoes and stockings for you now, dears? I'm
sure I shan't be able! I shall be a great deal too far off to
trouble myself about you: you must manage the best way
you can—but I must be kind to them,” thought Alice, “or
perhaps they won't walk the way I want to go! Let me see: I'll
give them a new pair of boots every Christmas.”

Chapter II may be
assigned as selfsustained reading,

SPI 0801.6.3
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And she went on planning to herself how she would manage
it. “They must go by the carrier,” she thought; “and how
funny it'll seem, sending presents to one's own feet! And how
odd the directions will look:

Alice's Right Foot, Esq.
Hearthrug,
near the Fender,

Write about a time
when you felt you
were talking or
thinking nonsense.

(with Alice's love).
“Oh dear, what nonsense I'm talking!”
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Just then her head struck against the roof of the hall: in fact
she was now rather more than nine feet high, and she at
once took up the little golden key and hurried off to the
garden door.
Poor Alice! It was as much as she could do, lying down on
one side, to look through into the garden with one eye; but to
get through was more hopeless than ever: she sat down and
began to cry again.
“You ought to be ashamed of yourself,” said Alice, “a great
girl like you,” (she might well say this), “to go on crying in
this way! Stop this moment, I tell you!” But she went on all
the same, shedding gallons of
tears, until there was a large
pool all around her, about four
inches deep and reaching half
down the hall.
After a time she heard a little
pattering of feet in the distance,
and she hastily dried her eyes to
see what was coming. It was the
White
Rabbit
returning,
splendidly dressed, with a pair of
white kid gloves in one hand and
a large fan in the other: he came
trotting along in a great hurry, muttering to himself as he
came, “Oh! the Duchess, the Duchess! Oh! won't she be
savage if I've kept her waiting!” Alice felt so desperate that
she was ready to ask help of any one; so, when the Rabbit
came near her, she began in a low timid voice, “If you please,
sir—” The Rabbit started violently, dropped the white kid
gloves and the fan, and scurried away into the darkness as
hard as he could go.
Alice took up the fan and gloves, and, as the hall was very
hot, she kept fanning herself all the time she went on
talking: “Dear, dear! How queer everything is today! And
yesterday things went on just as usual. I wonder if I've been
84
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changed in the night? Let me think: was I the same when I
got up this morning? I almost think I can remember feeling a
little different. But if I'm not the same, the next question is,
Who in the world am I? Ah, that’s the great puzzle!” And she
began thinking over all the children she knew that were of
the same age as herself, to see if she could have been
changed for any of them.
“`I'm sure I'm not Ada,” she said, “for her hair goes in such
long ringlets, and mine doesn't go in ringlets at all; and I'm
sure I can't be Mabel, for I know all sorts of things, and she,
oh! she knows such a very little! Besides, she’s she, and I'm
I, and—oh, dear, how puzzling it all is! I'll try if I know all the
things I used to know. Let me see: four times five is twelve,
and four times six is thirteen, and four times seven is—oh
dear! I shall never get to twenty at that rate! However, the
Multiplication Table doesn't signify; let's try Geography.
London is the capital of Paris, and Paris is the capital of
Rome, and Rome—no, that’s all wrong, I'm certain! I must
have been changed for Mabel! I'll try and say ‘How doth the
little—’” and she crossed her hands on her lap, as if she were
saying lessons, and began to repeat it, but her voice sounded
hoarse and strange, and the words did not come the same as
they used to do:

SPI 0801.6.3
signify:
represent, betoken,
mean

“How doth the little crocodile
Improve his shining tail,
And pour the waters of the Nile
On every golden scale!
How cheerfully he seems to grin,
How neatly spread his claws,
And welcome little fishes in

“How doth the
Little Crocodile” is
a parody of “How
doth the Little Bee”
by Isaac Watts
(1715). Look up
the word “parody”
and write down its
meaning.

With gently smiling jaws!”

“I'm sure those are not the right words,” said poor Alice, and
her eyes filled with tears again as she went on, “I must be
Mabel after all, and I shall have to go and live in that poky
85
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little house, and have next to no toys to play with, and oh!
ever so many lessons to learn! No, I've made up my mind
about it: if I'm Mabel, I'll stay down here! It'll be no use their
putting their heads down and saying ‘Come up again, dear!’ I
shall only look up and say, ‘Who am I then? Tell me that
first, and then, if I like being that person, I'll come up; if not,
I'll stay down here till I'm somebody else’—but, oh, dear!”
cried Alice, with a sudden burst of tears, “I do wish they
would put their heads down! I am so very tired of being all
alone here!”
As she said this she looked down at her hands, and was
surprised to see that she had put on one of the Rabbit's little
white kid gloves while she was talking. “How can I have done
that?” she thought. “I must be growing small again.” She got
up and went to the table to measure herself by it, and found
that, as nearly as she could guess, she was now about two
feet high, and was going on shrinking rapidly; she soon
found out that the cause of this was the fan she was holding,
and she dropped it hastily, just in time to avoid shrinking
away altogether.
“That was a narrow escape!” said Alice, a good deal
frightened at the sudden change, but very glad to find herself
still in existence; “and now for the garden!” and she ran with
all speed back to the little door; but, alas! the little door was
shut again and the little golden key was lying on the glass
table as before, “and things are worse than ever,” thought
the poor child, “for I never was so small as this before, never!
And I declare it's too bad, that it is!”
As she said these words her foot slipped, and in another
moment, splash! she was up to her chin in salt water. Her
first idea was that she had somehow fallen into the sea, “and
in that case I can go back by railway,” she said to herself.
(Alice had been to the seaside once in her life, and had come
to the general conclusion that wherever you go to on the
English coast you find a number of bathing-machines in the
sea, some children digging in the sand with wooden spades,
then a row of lodging houses, and behind them a railway
86
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station.) However, she soon made out that she was in the
pool of tears which she had wept when she was nine feet
high.
“I wish I hadn't cried
so much!” said Alice,
as she swam about,
trying to find her way
out.
“I
shall
be
punished for it now, I
suppose,
by
being
drowned in my own
tears! That will be a
queer thing, to be sure!
However, everything is
queer today.”
Just then she heard something splashing about in the pool a
little way off, and she swam nearer to make out what it was;
at first she thought it must be a walrus or hippopotamus,
but then she remembered how small she was now, and she
soon made out that it was only a mouse, that had slipped in
like herself.
“Would it be of any use, now,” thought Alice, “to speak to
this mouse? Everything is so out-of-the-way down here that I
should think very likely it can talk; at any rate, there's no
harm in trying.” So she began: “O Mouse, do you know the
way out of this pool? I am very tired of swimming about here,
O Mouse!” (Alice thought this must be the right way of
speaking to a mouse: she had never done such a thing
before, but she remembered having seen in her brother's
Latin Grammar, “A mouse—of a mouse—to a mouse—a
mouse—O mouse!” The Mouse looked at her rather
inquisitively, and seemed to her to wink with one of its little
eyes, but it said nothing.
“Perhaps it doesn't understand English,” thought Alice; “I
daresay it's a French mouse, come over with William the
Conqueror.” (For, with all her knowledge of history, Alice had
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no very clear notion how long ago anything had happened.)
So she began again: “Ou est ma chatte?” which was the first
sentence in her French lesson book. The Mouse gave a
sudden leap out of the water, and seemed to quiver all over
with fright. “Oh, I beg your pardon!” cried Alice hastily,
afraid that she had hurt the poor animal's feelings. “I quite
forgot you didn't like cats.”
“Not like cats!” cried the Mouse, in a shrill, passionate voice.
“Would you like cats if you were me?”
“Well, perhaps not,”' said Alice in a soothing tone; “don't be
angry about it. And yet I wish I could show you our cat
Dinah; I think you'd take a fancy to cats if you could only see
her. She is such a dear quiet thing,” Alice went on, half to
herself, as she swam lazily about in the pond, “and she sits
purring so nicely by the fire, licking her paws and washing
her face—and she is such a nice soft thing to nurse—and
she's such a capital one for catching mice—Oh, I beg your
pardon!” cried Alice again; for this time the Mouse was
bristling all over, and she felt certain it must be really
offended. “We won't talk about her any more if you'd rather
not.”
“We indeed!” cried the Mouse, who was trembling down to
the end of his tail. “As if I would talk on such a subject! Our
family always hated cats—nasty, low, vulgar things! Don't let
me hear the name again!”

William of
Normandy
conquered
England in AD
1066; this book
was published in
AD 1865. Could
this mouse have
come over with
William the
Conqueror?

Speech that is right
in one context may
be wrong in
another. Have you
ever said
something you
shouldn’t have?
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What does the
Mouse reveal by
using the terms
“low” and “vulgar”
when referring to
cats?
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“I won't indeed!” said
Alice, in a great hurry to
change the subject of
conversation. “Are you—
are
you
fond—of—of
dogs?” The Mouse did
not answer, so Alice
went on eagerly: “There
is such a nice little dog
near our house I should like to show you! A little bright-eyed
terrier, you know, with oh! such long curly brown hair! And
it'll fetch things when you throw them, and it'll sit up and
beg for its dinner, and all sorts of things—I can't remember
half of them—and it belongs to a farmer, you know, and he
says it's so useful it's worth a hundred pounds! He says it
kills all the rats and—oh dear!” cried Alice in a sorrowful
tone, “I'm afraid I've offended it again!” For the Mouse was
swimming away from her as hard as it could go, and making
quite a commotion in the pool as it went.
So she called softly after it, “Mouse dear! Do come back
again, and we won't talk about cats or dogs either, if you
don't like them!” When the Mouse heard this, it turned and
swam slowly back to her; its face was quite pale (with
passion, Alice thought), and it said in a low, trembling voice,
“Let us get to the shore, and then I'll tell you my history, and
you'll understand why it is I hate cats and dogs.”
It was high time to go, for the pool was getting quite crowded
with the birds and animals that had fallen into it. There was
a Duck and a Dodo, a Lory and an Eaglet, and several other
curious creatures. Alice led the way, and the whole party
swam to the shore.
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Chapter III

A Caucus Race and a Long Tale
They were indeed a queer-looking party that assembled on
the bank—the birds with draggled feathers, the animals with
their fur clinging close to them, and all dripping wet, cross,
and uncomfortable.
The first question of course was, how to get dry again; they
had a consultation about this, and after a few minutes it
seemed quite natural to Alice to find herself talking familiarly
with them, as if she had known them all her life. Indeed, she
had quite a long argument with the Lory, who at last turned
sulky, and would only say, “I am older than you, and must
know better”; and this Alice would not allow, without
knowing how old it was, and as the Lory positively refused to
tell its age, there was no more to be said.
At last the Mouse, who seemed to be a person of authority
among them, called out, “Sit down, all of you, and listen to
me! I'll soon make you dry enough!” They all sat down at
once, in a large ring, with the Mouse in the middle. Alice
kept her eyes anxiously fixed on it, for she felt sure she
would catch a bad cold if she did not get dry very soon.
“Ahem!” said the Mouse with an important air, “are you all
ready? This is the driest thing I know. Silence all round, if
you please! ‘William the Conqueror, whose cause was
favoured by the pope, was soon submitted to by the English,
who wanted leaders, and had been of late much accustomed
to usurpation and conquest. Edwin and Morcar, the earls of
Mercia and Northumbria—’”
“Ugh!” said the Lory, with a shiver.
“I beg your pardon!” said the Mouse, frowning, but very
politely. “Did you speak?”
“Not I!” said the Lory hastily.
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“I thought you did,” said the Mouse. “I proceed. ‘Edwin and
Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for
him; and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of
Canterbury, found it advisable—’”
“Found what?” said the Duck.
“Found it,” the Mouse replied rather crossly; “of course you
know what ‘it’ means.”
“I know what ‘it’ means well enough, when I find a thing,”
said the Duck; “it's generally a frog or a worm. The question
is, What did the archbishop find?”
The Mouse did not notice this question, but hurriedly went
on: “’—found it advisable to go with Edgar Atheling to meet
William and offer him the crown. William's conduct at first
was moderate. But the insolence of his Normans—’ How are
you getting on now, my dear?” it continued, turning to Alice
as it spoke.

SPI 0801.1.1
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“As wet as ever,” said Alice in a melancholy tone; “it doesn't
seem to dry me at all.”
“In that case,” said the Dodo solemnly, rising to its feet, “I
move that the meeting adjourn, for the immediate adoption
of more energetic remedies—”
“Speak English!” said the Eaglet. “I don't know the meaning
of half those long words, and, what's more, I don't believe
you do either!” And the Eaglet bent down its head to hide a
smile; some of the other birds tittered audibly.
“What I was going to say,” said the Dodo in an offended tone,
“was, that the best thing to get us dry would be a Caucusrace.”
“What is a Caucus-race?” said Alice; not that she wanted
much to know, but the Dodo had paused as if it thought that
somebody ought to speak, and no one else seemed inclined
to say anything.
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“Why,” said the Dodo, “the best way to explain it is to do it.”
(And, as you might like to try the thing yourself, some winter
day, I will tell you how the Dodo managed it.)
First it marked out a race course, in a sort of circle (“the
exact shape doesn't matter,” it said), and then all the party
were placed along the course, here and there. There was no
“One, two, three, and away,” but they began running when
they liked, and left off when they liked, so that it was not
easy to know when the race was over. However, when they
had been running half an hour or so, and were quite dry
again, the Dodo suddenly called out “The race is over!” and
they all crowded round it, panting, and asking, “But who has
won?”
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great
deal of thought, and it sat for a long time with one finger
pressed upon its forehead (the position in which you usually
see Shakespeare, in the pictures of him), while the rest
waited in silence. At last the Dodo said, “everybody has won,
and all must have prizes.”
“But who is to give the prizes?” quite a chorus of voices
asked.
“Why, she, of course,” said the Dodo, pointing to Alice with
one finger; and the whole party at once crowded round her,
calling out in a confused way, “Prizes! Prizes!”
Alice had no idea what to do, and in despair she put her
hand in her pocket, and pulled out a box of comfits, (luckily
the salt water had not got into it), and handed them round
as prizes. There was exactly one apiece all round.
“But she must have a prize herself, you know,” said the
Mouse.
“Of course,” the Dodo replied very gravely. “What else have
you got in your pocket?” he went on, turning to Alice.
“Only a thimble,” said Alice sadly.
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“Hand it over here,” said the Dodo.
Then they all crowded
round her once more,
while the Dodo solemnly
presented the thimble,
saying, “We beg your
acceptance of this elegant
thimble”; and, when it
had finished this short
speech they all cheered.
Alice thought the whole
thing very absurd, but
they all looked so grave
that she did not dare to
laugh, and, as she could
not think of anything to say, she simply bowed, and took the
thimble, looking as solemn as she could.

What sort of
speech is this?

Can you think of a
time when you
have had to refrain
from laughing to
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feelings?

The next thing was to eat the comfits; this caused some
noise and confusion, as the large birds complained that they
could not taste theirs, and the small ones choked and had to
be patted on the back. However, it was over at last, and they
sat down again in a ring and begged the Mouse to tell them
something more.
“You promised to tell me
your history, you know,”
said Alice, “and why it is
you hate—C and D,” she
added in a whisper, half
afraid that it would be
offended again.
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“Mine is a long and a
sad tale!” said the
Mouse, turning to Alice,
and sighing.
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“It is a long tail, certainly,” said Alice, looking down with
wonder at the Mouse's tail; “but why do you call it sad?” And
she kept on puzzling about it while the Mouse was speaking,
so that her idea of the tale was something like this:
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“Fury said to a
mouse, That he
met in the
house,
‘Let us
both go to
law: I will
prosecute
you. Come,
I'll take no
denial: We
must have a
trial; For
really this
morning I've
nothing
to do.’
Said the
mouse to the
cur, ‘Such
a trial,
dear Sir,
With
no jury
or judge,
would be
wasting
our breath.’
‘I'll be
judge, I'll
be jury,’
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Said
cunning
old Fury:
‘I'll try
the whole
cause,
and
condemn
you
to
death.’"
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“You are not attending!” said the Mouse to Alice severely.
“What are you thinking of?”
94

SPI 0801.1.5
Re-write this
question so that it
does not end with
preposition.

“I beg your pardon,” said Alice very humbly, “you had got to
the fifth bend, I think?”
“I had not!” cried the Mouse sharply and very angrily.
“A knot!” said Alice, always ready to make herself useful, and
looking anxiously about her. “Oh, do let me help to undo it!”
“I shall do nothing of the sort,” said the Mouse, getting up
and walking away. “You insult me by talking such
nonsense!”
“I didn't mean it!” pleaded poor Alice. “But you're so easily
offended, you know!”
The Mouse only growled in reply.
“Please come back and finish your story!” Alice called after it;
and the others all joined in chorus, “Yes, please do!” but the
Mouse only shook its head impatiently, and walked a little
quicker.
“What a pity it wouldn't stay!” sighed the Lory, as soon as it
was quite out of sight; and an old Crab took the opportunity
of saying to her daughter “Ah, my dear! Let this be a lesson
to you never to lose your temper!”
“Hold your tongue, Ma!” said the young Crab, a little
snappishly. “You're enough to try the patience of an oyster!”
“I wish I had our Dinah here, I know I do!” said Alice aloud,
addressing nobody in particular. “She'd soon fetch it back!”
“And who is Dinah, if I might venture to ask the question?”
said the Lory.
Alice replied eagerly, for she was always ready to talk about
her pet. “Dinah's our cat. And she's such a capital one for
catching mice, you can't think! And, oh, I wish you could see
her after the birds! Why, she'll eat a little bird as soon as
look at it!”
---- Predict what will happen next. ---95
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This speech caused a remarkable sensation among the
party. Some of the birds hurried off at once; one old Magpie
began wrapping itself up very carefully, remarking, “I really
must be getting home; the night air doesn't suit my throat!”
and a Canary called out in a trembling voice to its children,
“Come away, my dears! It's high time you were all in bed!”
On various pretexts they all moved off, and Alice was soon
left alone.
“I wish I hadn't mentioned Dinah,” she said to herself in a
melancholy tone. “Nobody seems to like her down here, and
I'm sure she's the best cat in the world! Oh, my dear Dinah! I
wonder if I shall ever see you anymore!” And here poor Alice
began to cry again, for she felt very lonely and low-spirited.
In a little while, however, she again heard a little pattering of
footsteps in the distance, and she looked up eagerly, half
hoping that the Mouse had changed his mind, and was
coming back to finish his story.
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APPENDIX C
GRAPHIC ORGANIZERS

Think Aloud Rubric
Name: ________________________________ Date:________________________
Strategies
1. Makes connections:
self, text, world
2. Visualizes: makes pictures in head
3. Recalls details: summarizes
4. Questions as reads:
makes predictions
5. Self-monitors when confused: uses
fix-up strategies
6. Infers: reads between the lines
7. Evaluates & synthesizes material
8. Analyzes information in the text

# of times used

Questioning Web
Name:__________________________________

Date:______________________

Title: _________________________________________________________________

Questioning Web
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
_____________________
______

I’m thinking . . . __________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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Character Analysis Chart
Character’s Name

Appearance

Speech
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